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FAMILY, CUBICLE MATE AND EVERYONE IN BETWEEN: A
NOVEL APPROACH TO PROTECTING EMPLOYEES FROM
THIRD-PARTY RETALIATION UNDER TITLE VII AND
KINDRED STATUTES
Matthew W Green Jr. *
I. INTRODUCTION
Is the Supreme Court "pro-employee?" Some may question the
seriousness of that inquiry considering some of the Court's recent
employment discrimination decisions, which have been cast as favoring
businesses rather than the people they employ.' Indeed, in 2009, the
Congressional House Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights
and Civil Liberties held a hearing entitled Civil Rights Under Fire:
Recent Supreme Court Decisions that critiqued the narrow interpretation
the Court has recently given civil rights statutes, including employment
discrimination laws, the effects of those interpretations and what, if
anything, Congress could do about it. 2  In his opening remarks, the
* Assistant Professor, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law; LL.M., Columbia
University, Harlan Fiske Stone Scholar; J.D., University of Baltimore School of Law, Magna
Cum Laude; B.A., University of Maryland, College Park; law clerk to the Hon. Eric L. Clay,
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 2001-2002 and the Hon. Deborah K. Chasanow,
U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, 2000-2001. I owe very special thanks to the
Cleveland-Marshall Fund and the Summer Research Grants Committee at the Cleveland-
Marshall College of Law for providing the support necessary to work on this project. I also
owe thanks to Professor Michael Hayes at the University of Baltimore School of Law for his
mentorship and our numerous helpful discussions regarding the Supreme Court's recent
retaliation decisions. Similarly, I owe thanks to Professor Michael Z. Green at Texas
Wesleyan University School of Law for his very helpful comments and critiques of an earlier
draft of this article. I would also like to thank my colleagues Professors Susan J. Becker,
Lolita Buckner Innis, Browne C. Lewis and Brian E. Ray at the Cleveland-Marshall College
of Law for their comments and encouragement regarding this article, as well as to my research
assistants Sarena Holder and Jill Battagline-Goff for their hard work. Each person listed in
this footnote provided invaluable assistance, and any shortcomings appearing in this article
are solely my own.
1. See infra note 3 and accompanying text.
2. See Civil Rights Under Fire: Recent Supreme Court Decisions Before the Subcomm.
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Subcommittee Chair Michigan Representative John Conyers Jr.
proclaimed that the Court had recently "interpret[ed] statutes so
narrowly that [it has] weaken[ed] . . . employment rights of
Americans."
Those sentiments expressed during the congressional hearing may
be true of some of the Court's recent employment discrimination
decisions,4 but the Court has taken a decidedly less restrictive path when
interpreting the anti-retaliation provisions under employment
discrimination statutes, particularly Title VII. As one commentator
recently noted, the inquiry about a "pro-employee" Court may be a
reasonable one when considering recent retaliation decisions.' Since
2006, the Court has decided five cases regarding workplace retaliation.
on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, I 1Ith
Cong. (2009), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/I 1lth/ill-
32_52708.PDF.
3. Id. (statement of the Hon. John Conyers, Jr.), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Conyers091008.pdf. Two of the cases that
Representative Conyers referenced to demonstrate his point that the Court has too narrowly
interpreted civil right statutes were employment discrimination decisions, Ledbetter v.
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), and Gross v. FBL Financial Services,
557 U.S. 167, 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009). Both Ledbetter and Gross were decided by a five-to-
four vote and split along ideological lines. In Ledbetter, a five-member majority of the Court
interpreted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to narrow the window of time in which a
plaintiff must challenge an alleged discriminatory pay-setting decision. See Ledbetter, 550
U.S. at 623-25. Congress subsequently abrogated Ledbetter with the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay
Act. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.); see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-
5(e)(3)(A) (West 2011). In Gross, the same five-member majority reversed every court of
appeals to have decided the issue and held that under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act ("ADEA"), a plaintiff alleging age discrimination could no longer hold an employer liable
under the statute simply by showing that age, in part, motivated an adverse employment
decision. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2350. Rather, age had to be the reason for the adverse
employment decision for liability to arise under the statute. See id. at 2355-56. But see id. at
2355 n.5, 2356 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining that courts of appeals to have considered
the matter held a mixed-motive theory applicable to ADEA claims). Cases such as Gross and
Ledbetter have caused the Roberts Court to be painted as being hostile to employment
discrimination protections for workers. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court at
Age Three, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 947, 962 (2008) (calling the Roberts Court the most pro-
business since the mid-1930s and arguing that this is "manifest in many different areas"
including "employment discrimination").
4. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
5. See Michael J. Zimmer, A Pro-Employee Supreme Court?: The Retaliation
Decisions, 60 S.C. L. REV. 917, 917-18 (2009) (answering the question of whether the Court
is pro-employee in the affirmative when it comes to retaliation and arguing that, in its
retaliation decisions, the Court has taken a pragmatic approach to interpreting anti-
discrimination statutes).
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The plaintiff prevailed in each case.6 None were decided by a five-to-
four vote, representing the classic ideological split among current
justices. The most recent decision, Thompson v. North American
Stainless LP, was unanimous.
Thompson continues the Court's "pro-employee" trend, at least as
far as its retaliation decisions go, by recognizing the viability of third-
party retaliation claims under Title VII and kindred statutes, an issue that
had divided the lower courts for decades.8 Third-party reprisal claims
arise when an employee engages in "protected activity" under the
statute, such as complaining to an employer or the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") about unlawful discrimination, but
is not punished directly by the employer for doing so.9 Such persons
who complain about workplace discrimination are sometimes labeled
"troublemakers." 0 Under the typical retaliation paradigm, an employer
punishes the troublemaker directly for engaging in protected activity. In
the context of third-party retaliation, however, the employer indirectly
punishes the troublemaker by targeting the troublemaker's "friend.""
The word "friend" is used here in its broadest sense; the person who is
punished is often more than just a friend, such as a spouse, relative or a
romantic partner. 12 Thompson now determines which "friends" will be
protected against third-party retaliation.13
This Article begins the discussion in the post-Thompson era of who
6. See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 870 (2011) (reversing lower
court judgment in favor of employer and holding that Title VII makes third-party retaliation
unlawful); Crawford v. Metro. Gov't, 555 U.S. 271, 274 (2009) (reversing lower court in
favor of employer and holding that anti-retaliation provision extends protection to employees
who participate in an employer's internal investigation into discrimination by answering
questions about potential discrimination they have witnessed); CBOCS West, Inc. v.
Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 445 (2008) (holding retaliation cause of action viable under 42
U.S.C. § 1981 although statute says nothing expressly about retaliation); Gomez-Perez v.
Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 477 (2008) (same holding as in CBOCS-in this case involving the
federal-sector provisions of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, which also does not
contain an express anti-retaliation provision); Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548
U.S. 53, 70 (2006) (affirming jury verdict in favor of employee in Title VII anti-retaliation
decision).
7. 131 S. Ct. 863.
8. See discussion infra Part III.A. 1-2.
9. See Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 868.
10. Alex B. Long, The Troublemaker's Friend: Retaliation Against Third Parties and
the Right ofAssociation in the Workplace, 59 FLA. L. REv. 931, 933 (2007).
11. Id.
12. See discussion infra Part III.B. 1-2.
13. See discussion infra Parts III.D., IV.
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should be protected against third-party retaliation and when. It
demonstrates that third-party retaliation should extend beyond protecting
individuals involved in close, intimate relationships. Moreover, it shows
that understanding third-party retaliation in this light is consistent with
Thompson, Title VII's broadly worded anti-discrimination statute, and
the purposes that underlie it.
The potential effects of Thompson are broad. First, third-party
retaliation claims have arisen under virtually all federal anti-
discrimination statutes.14 While Thompson arose under Title VII, that
decision and interpretations of it will, in all likelihood, apply to other
federal anti-discrimination statutes with similarly worded anti-retaliation
provisions.' 5 Moreover, the Court rejected any definitive line drawing
regarding the employees or types of relationships that warrant protection
against third-party retaliation.16 Instead, the Court relied on another of
its recent retaliation cases, Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co.
v. White,'7 to guide courts in determining whom to protect against third-
party retaliation and when. Burlington held that an employer violates
Title VII's anti-retaliation provisions when, in response to an
employee's protected activity, the employer takes action that a
reasonable employee would find materially adverse. 8 Thompson applies
Burlington in the context of a third-party retaliation claim.19 The third
party who does not complain of discrimination is protected against an
employer's retaliatory act if that retaliation might dissuade a reasonable
14. See Brief for Petitioner at 5-6, Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, 131 S. Ct. 863
(2011) (No. 09-291), 2010 WL 3501186 at *5-6 (noting that "[tihe problem of reprisals
against third parties is not limited to Title VII," but has arisen under "[v]irtually all federal
statutes governing the employment relationship," including the ADEA, ADA, the
Occupational Safety and Health Act ("OSHA"), and the Family Medical Leave Act
("FMLA")).
15. See discussion infra note 86 and accompanying text (explaining that the anti-
retaliation provisions of Title VII and several other anti-discrimination statutes, such as the
ADA and ADEA, are similar if not identical and courts have typically interpreted the anti-
retaliation provisions of these disparate statutes similarly). At least one court has suggested
that Thompson's holding also may apply to civil rights statutes that do not contain an express
anti-retaliation provision similar to Title VII but that nevertheless have been interpreted to
protect against retaliation. See Condiff v. Hart County School Dist., 770 F. Supp. 2d 876, 883
n.4 (W.D. Ky. 2011) (noting that in light of Thompson, plaintiff may be able to state a prima
facie case of third-party retaliation under Title IX, which contains no express anti-retaliation
provision but is analyzed using the standard used for Title VII claims).
16. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 868.
17. 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
18. Id. at 68.
19. See Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 867-70.
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person in the position of the complaining employee (i.e., the
troublemaker) from engaging in protected activity.20
Before Thompson, most courts that recognized the viability of third-
party retaliation claims under Title VII or kindred statutes required a
"close relationship" between the employee who engaged in protected
activity and the employee who suffered an adverse action as a result.2'
In some cases, recognition extended only to a familial relationship
22between the employees. A close, intimate relationship between
employees continues to be relevant to third-party retaliation post
Thompson, but the scope of protection that Thompson affords employees
is not limited to instances where such relationships exist.23 To the
contrary, Thompson declined to identify a fixed class of relationships for
which third-party retaliation is unlawful.24
Consistent with Thompson, this Article rejects a formalistic,
mechanical approach to third-party retaliation of extending protection
against third-party retaliation when a fixed-class of relationships is
alleged and rejecting them in all other cases. Rather, the Article argues
that the material adversity standard should be read broadly to protect an
individual whenever there is proof that the employer targeted him or her
to punish a coworker who engaged in protected activity. The Article
further argues that, barring any circumstances unique to a particular
case, courts should find the material adversity hurdle cleared if the
adverse action alleged would meet the material adversity standard had
the employer taken that action directly against the person who engaged
in protected activity. Taking this approach to third-party retaliation
would at a minimum bar employers from doing indirectly to a third-
party-because of her association with the employee who engaged in
protected activity-what they undisputedly could not do directly to the
complaining employee herself because of her protected activity.
This Article demonstrates that, properly interpreted, Thompson
should protect third parties who, in some cases, do not fit the traditional
20. See id. at 868 ("We think it is obvious that a reasonable worker might be dissuaded
from engaging in protected activity if she knew that her fianc6 would be fired.").
21. See id. As used in this Article, the word "close," as in "close relationship," "close
associate," or "close association," refers to a relationship associated with intimacy or a close
affective bond, such as one between family members, love interests, or good friends; the cases
addressing third-party retaliation have used the word "close" in that context. See id.
22. See discussion infra Part III.B. 1-2.
23. See Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 868.
24. Id.
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third-party reprisal paradigm in which the third party is a relative,
paramour or close friend. 25  For example, pre-Thompson, a plaintiff
alleged third-party retaliation under the following set of facts:
George Cotton, a supervisory employee working for a large employer, engaged
in protected activity under Title VII. He subsequently requested that one of his
subordinates, Janice Bates, be given a promotion and raise, which he believed
she deserved. Their employer denied Cotton's request. Bates subsequently
filed her own charge of discrimination alleging that the employer denied
Cotton's request as part of a scheme to punish her and other employees who
associated with Cotton in an effort to get back at him for filing a discrimination
lawsuit. The EEOC found probable cause that Bates and Cotton's employer
denied Bates' promotion and raise because of her association with Cotton.26
Cases in which an employee claiming third-party retaliation alleged
only a professional relationship with a coworker who had engaged in
protected activity-as in Bates-were often summarily rejected prior to
Thompson.27  This Article demonstrates, however, that extending
protection in such a scenario is consistent with the broad, flexible
approach to third-party retaliation that Thompson adopts.
Despite the broadly worded anti-retaliation provision, there will be
some limits on the instances in which employees are protected against
retaliation. Those limits flow, in part, from the Court's holdings in
Burlington and Thompson, which do not protect workers against all
retaliation but against retaliation the courts find to be materially
adverse.28 As explained infra, however, the type of relationship alleged
should not alone foreclose a claim.
This Article is set forth in four parts. Part II discusses Burlington,
which set the stage for recognizing the viability of third-party retaliation
claims. Part III discusses third-party retaliation and why lower courts
25. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
26. Bates v. Clark County, No. 2:04-CV-00518-KJD-GWF, 2006 WL 3308214, at *1
(D. Nev. Nov. 13, 2006).
27. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.b. The court in this instance did not reject this
claim because of the relationship alleged, but because it held that third-party retaliation claims
were not-cognizable under Title VII. Bates, 2006 WL 3308214, at *3-4. However, for
reasons explained later, even if the court was one that recognized third-party retaliation pre-
Thompson, it is doubtful whether the claim would have survived, particularly in those courts
that required a close, intimate relationship between coworkers to state a viable third-party
retaliation claim. See id. infra Part III.B.2.b.
28. See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 868-69 (2011); see also
discussion infra Part IV.A-B.
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were split for decades on whether the theory was cognizable under Title
VII and kindred statutes. Part III also examines who the classes of
employees alleging third-party retaliation have traditionally included and
why courts only protected employees involved in certain types of
relationships from third-party retaliation. It explains that third-party
retaliation plaintiffs without a familial or close emotional bond to the
troublemaker received scant protection against this form of retaliation.
Part III also discusses Thompson, the Court's most recent, and
unanimous, retaliation decision, in which the Court expansively
interpreted Title VII's anti-retaliation provision by recognizing the
viability of third-party retaliation under the statute and rejecting the
identification of a fixed class of relationships for which third-party
retaliation is unlawful.29 Part IV calls for an expansive approach to
analyzing third-party retaliation claims and argues that doing so is
consistent with Thompson, as well as the broad text and purposes of
Title VII. The Article explores an expansive approach to third-party
retaliation claims by arguing that third-party retaliation should be
actionable even where there exists only a purely professional
relationship between the employee who lodged a discrimination
complaint and the employee who claimed she suffered an adverse action
as a result.
II. BURLINGTON AND THE MATERIAL ADVERSITY STANDARD: SETTING
THE STAGE FOR THIRD-PARTY RETALIATION CLAIMS
Although it was unknown when it was decided, Burlington would
later set the stage for recognizing the viability of third-party retaliation
claims.30 It was most likely unknown because the case (at least at first
blush) had nothing to do with third-party reprisals. 3 ' Rather, Burlington
29. See Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 868.
30. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
31. The facts in Burlington are as follows: Sheila White, the only woman working in
her department at the defendant's facility, was hired as a track laborer and assigned to operate
a forklift. Id. at 57. White was subsequently reassigned after her supervisor told her that he
had heard complaints that a more "senior man" should have the job as forklift operator. Id. at
58. White was later suspended for thirty-seven days without pay after an altercation with her
immediate supervisor. Id. After an investigation into the altercation, White was reinstated
with back pay. Burlington, 548 U.S. at 58-59. White claimed that her reassignment and
suspension were unlawful retaliation under Title VII. Id. at 59. After a jury trial and an en
banc Sixth Circuit decision in the plaintiffs favor, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
resolve a conflict among the circuits about the scope of Title VII's anti-retaliation provisions.
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established the standard for determining when an employer's adverse
action taken in response to an employee's protected activity under Title
32VII is sufficiently harmful to be actionable under the statute.
Specifically, Burlington addressed two issues: (1) whether the phrase
"discriminate against" under Title VII's anti-retaliation provision
confines itself to activity that affects the terms and conditions of
employment; and (2) how harmful such activity must be to be actionable
under the statute.
A. The Meaning of "To Discriminate Against"
Relying on both the broadly worded language and the purposes of
the anti-retaliation provision, the Court answered the first question in the
negative. 34 Title VII's anti-retaliation provision provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate
against any of his employees . . . because he has opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice [under Title VII], or because he has made a
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII].35
By contrast, the substantive provision, among other things, bars
employers from discriminating against an employee "with respect to ...
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of [his or her] race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 3 6 Thus, the
Id.
32. Id at 57.
33. See Burlington, 548 U.S. at 61. The Court also addressed whether the actions taken
against White fell within the scope of the statute. See id. at 70-73. The Court held that her
suspension and reassignment were sufficiently harmful to be actionable under the statute. See
id.
34. Id at 57.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
36. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The statute provides that:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer--(1) to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
employment opportunities . . . because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.
Id. § 2000e-2(a)(l)-(2).
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text of the substantive provision limits the scope of Title VII's protection
to actions that affect or alter the conditions of employment." The anti-
retaliation provision, on the other hand, contains no such limiting
language. The language merely provides that an employer may not
"discriminate against," or as more generally understood "retaliate
against," an employee because of that individual's protected activity.3
The language in the two provisions differs, and the Court presumed that
Congress intended that difference to matter.39
Moreover, according to the Court, the underlying purpose of the
anti-retaliation provision reinforces what the language already
indicates-broader protection against retaliation than is applicable to the
substantive provision. 4 0  The purpose of the substantive provision of
Title VII includes securing a workplace where individuals are free from
discrimination based on who they are, i.e., their status.4 1 The Court
reasoned that Congress only needed to bar employment-related
discrimination to secure that objective. 4 2 Conversely, the anti-retaliation
provision seeks to secure Title VII's primary objective by preventing
employers from interfering (via retaliation) with the employee's efforts
to enforce the statute's basic guarantees.43 That objective could only be
achieved by eliminating the many ways an employer might stymie an
employee's efforts to enforce his or her rights under the Act.44
According to the Court, "[a]n employer can effectively retaliate against
an employee by taking actions not directly related to his employment or
by causing him harm outside the workplace."45 A limited construction
of the anti-retaliation provision would thus undermine the primary
purpose of the anti-retaliation provision to "[m]aintain[] unfettered
access to statutory remedial mechanisms."4 6 The Court also explained
37. See Burlington, 548 U.S. at 62.
38. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)).
39. Id. at 62-63.
40. Id. at 63-64.
41. See Burlington, 548 U.S. at 63.
42. Id
43. See id. at 64.
44. See id. at 63.
45. Burlington, 548 U.S. at 63-64. As Judge Richard Posner has colorfully put it,
"[s]hooting a person for filing a complaint of discrimination would be an effective method of
retaliation . . . ." McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 259 (7th Cir. 1996). Such an act
would certainly deter an employee from complaining about discrimination, but would have
nothing to do with the workplace in the way that docking an employee's pay or demoting him
would.
46. Burlington, 548 U.S. at 64.
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that a broad interpretation of the anti-retaliation provision was necessary
because the enforcement of Title VII depends on individuals who are
willing to file complaints and act as witnesses.47 Effective enforcement
can only be achieved if individuals feel free to approach their employers
or the EEOC with their grievances without fear of reprisal.4 8
The Court also rejected arguments by Burlington and the United
States, which filed an amicus brief, that to be actionable an employer's
retaliation should result in a tangible employment action.49 In its sexual
harassment cases, for instance, the Court has allowed employers to assert
an affirmative defense to hostile work environment claims unless the
employer has taken a so-called "tangible employment action" against the
employee, such as "hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with
significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant
change in benefits."50 Burlington argued that this limitation should be
placed on the term "discriminate against" under the anti-retaliation
provision.51  The Court rejected the argument, explaining that the
Court's sexual harassment decisions did not control the issue, as those
decisions neither discussed the scope of the substantive provision nor
mentioned Title VII's anti-retaliation provision.s2 At most, the Court
explained, limiting actionable retaliation to tangible employment actions
was merely the standard that Burlington and the United States wanted
the Court to adopt, not a standard compelled by the language of the anti-
retaliation provision.
B. Actionable Harm: The Material Adversity Standard
Prior to Burlington, lower courts took different approaches
regarding how harmful a particular adverse action had to be to make out
an actionable retaliation claim. The Fifth and Eighth Circuits applied the
most restrictive standard, insisting that a plaintiff show an "ultimate
employment" action, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote or
47. Id. at 67.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 64 (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998)).
50. Burlington, 548 U.S. at 64 (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742,
761 (1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 64-65.
53. Id. at 64-65 (explaining that sexual harassment precedent does not compel the Court
to limit actionable retaliation to tangible employment actions).
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compensation decisions.5 4  At the other end of the spectrum was the
Ninth Circuit, which made actionable "any adverse treatment that [was]
based on a retaliatory motive and [was] reasonably likely to deter the
charging party or others from engaging in protected activity."55 Other
circuits adopted standards somewhere in the middle of these two
extremes. 56
The Burlington Court adopted one of the middle-of-the-road
approaches.5 7 It held that for an actionable retaliation claim, a plaintiff
must show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged
action materially adverse. This means that the employee must
demonstrate that the challenged action "might have dissuaded a
reasonable worker from" engaging in protected activity." The Court
reasoned that the material adversity standard struck a balance between
the trivial and the significant, determining that the statute cannot
immunize employees from a lack of good manners, "petty slights or
minor annoyances that often [occur] . . . and that all employees
54. See id. at 60. The standard indeed set a high bar for actionable retaliation. For
instance, a decision that clearly limited "an employee's opportunities for promotion" did not
qualify as an ultimate employment action. See, e.g., Banks v. E. Baton Rouge Paris School
Bd., 320 F.3d 570, 575 (5th Cir. 2003).
55. Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1242-43 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing EEOC
Compliance Manual Section 8, "Retaliation," 1 8008 (1998)). The standard ultimately
adopted by the Supreme Court in Burlington is more exacting than the deterrence standard
articulated by the Ninth Circuit in Ray, as the Ninth Circuit, pre-Burlington, did not require a
plaintiff to prove that an adverse action taken in response to the plaintiffs protected activity
was material or significant. See id.; see also Siller v. Nevada, 385 Fed. Appx. 669, 671 (9th
Cir. 2010) (explaining that, pursuant to the rule articulated by the court in Ray, a lateral
transfer may constitute an adverse employment action, but the Court in Burlington explained
that such a transfer is not actionable unless the plaintiff shows that it also materially adverse);
infra notes 66-75 and accompanying text (explaining the standard adopted by the Court in
Burlington).
56. See, e.g., Washington v. Illinois Dept. of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir.
2005) (finding that action may be materially adverse and thus actionable if it affects pay or
promotion opportunities). The circumstances unique to a particular case may also be relevant
in determining whether the alleged harm rises to the level of being actionable, such as where
an employer seeks to exploit a vulnerability of the employee; thus, an actionable claim may
exist where, for instance, an employee who the employer knows has a nervous condition is
moved "from a quiet office to one where Muzak plays constantly." Id See generally
Burlington, 548 U.S. at 60-61 (explaining various approaches courts used prior to
Burlington).
57. See Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68 (adopting standard used in the D.C. and Seventh
Circuits).
58. See id.
59. Id.
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experience." 60  The Court assumed that such actions would not deter
employee complaints about discrimination.6'
The Court did not identify a precise dividing line between
unprotected trivial harms and protected material or "significant" harms,
although it cited some adverse acts that it thought too petty to be
62actionable, such as snubbing by a supervisor or coworkers. The Court
explained, however, that the material adversity standard is stated in
general terms because the significance of a given act of retaliation will
63depend on the particular circumstances. In other words, "[c]ontext
matters."6 For instance, the Court explained that typically a schedule
change may matter little to an employee, but may matter a great deal to a
young mother with school-age children.
The material adversity standard has been heavily criticized both for
going too far to protect employees against retaliation and for not going
66far enough. For instance, Deborah Brake and Joanna Grossman have
60. Id.
61. See Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68; see also Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219
(D.C. Cir. 2006) (explaining that "trivial" actions do not become the makings of a federal
lawsuit because an employer's retaliatory action must be significant enough to dissuade a
reasonable employee from engaging in protected activity); id. (quoting Brown v. Brody, 199
F.3d 446, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1999)) (internal quotations omitted) (explaining that plaintiff must
show "materially adverse consequences . . . such that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude
that the plaintiff has suffered objectively tangible harm").
62. Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68 (explaining that "personality conflicts ... that generate
antipathy and snubbing by supervisors and co-workers" appear to constitute trivial, non-
actionable harm); see also id. (noting that in the context of sexual harassment, sporadic use of
abusive language, gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing are part of the everyday
tribulations that arise in the workplace and are not actionable).
63. Id. at 69.
64. Id.
65. Burlington, 548 U.S. at 69. The Court provided another example that separates the
trivial from the significant. It stated that typically a supervisor's refusal to invite a
subordinate to lunch is a petty, non-actionable slight, but if that lunch is part of a weekly
training program that contributes significantly to the employee's professional development,
the refusal to invite the employee becomes actionable. See id.
66. Compare Lisa M. Durham Taylor, Adding Subjective Fuel to the Vague-Standard
Fire: A Proposal for Congressional Intervention After Burlington Northern & Santa Fe
Railway Co. v. White, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 533, 533-34 (2007) (arguing that "the Court
went too far in [Burlington], implementing a vague and highly subjective standard that affords
employees who complain of discrimination, whether founded or not, what in practicality
amounts to near immunity from even the slightest changes in working conditions"), and
Nicholas Villani, Note, A Bridge Too Far: The Supreme Court Overextends the Anti-
Retaliation Provision of Title VII, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 715, 719, 738-44 (2007) (arguing that
courts should exercise restraint in applying the material adversity standard because if it is too
broadly applied, it has the potential for courts to be inundated with new Title VII retaliation
claims), with Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII As a Rights-
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argued that the material adversity standard is devoid of any empirical
support concerning the types of adversity that actually cause some
people not to complain of discrimination.67 They cite social science
literature demonstrating that fear of social ostracism (arguably a type of
snubbing) actually deters individuals from complaining about
discrimination; yet many courts have considered such fears too trivial to
satisfy the material adversity standard without the plaintiff also alleging
some tangible harm (e.g., an action affecting pay or benefits).68
Professors Brake and Grossman explain that in many instances, "lower
courts [have] expect[ed] the reasonable employee to endure a substantial
degree of adversity for the sake of challenging discrimination" based on
nothing more than "normative judgments about the level of adversity
employees should [be able to] tolerate in exchange for the privilege of
asserting Title VII rights."
To be sure, the Court could have gone further to protect employees
against retaliation. For instance, the Court could have adopted the
deterrence standard used by the Ninth Circuit pre-Burlington, which
sought to weed out trivial harms, but also would have potentially offered
employees greater protection against retaliation as that standard did not
require employees to prove a challenged adverse action was material or
significant.70 That standard certainly would have comported with the
Court's stated goals of "construing the anti-retaliation provision to cover
a broad range of employer conduct" because the statute is written
broadly. Despite these criticisms and shortcomings, the material
adversity standard the Court did adopt represents a relatively expansive,
even if less than optimal, approach to interpreting the anti-retaliation
provision. The Court rejected arguments that an adverse action
Claiming System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859, 908 (2008) (arguing that social science research
indicates that fear of social ostracism deters employees from complaining about
discrimination; yet lower courts have required employees to allege some tangible harm or
something more than their fear of ostracism to clear the material adversity hurdle).
67. See Brake & Grossman, supra note 66, at 912.
68. See id. at 908, 911. Professors Brake and Grossman criticize Burlington's material
adversity standard as not reflective of the actual harms that deter employees from complaining
about discrimination. Id. at 904-12 (noting that Burlington presupposes a hypothetical
employee who is "resilient, self-sufficient, and willing to risk the loss of congenial
relationships at work in exchange for assertion of civil rights"). According to the authors, the
material adversity standard is a "mismatch between widely shared expectations about how
employees respond to discrimination and their actual responses." Id. at 913.
69. Id. at 908, 912.
70. See Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1242-43; see also Burlington, 548 U.S. at 69.
71. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, L.P., 131 S. Ct. 863, 868.
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necessarily had to relate to the employee's employment, and it also held
that the material adversity standard should take into account the unique
circumstances of a particular case.
Before explaining how the Court interpreted Burlington's material
adversity standard to recognize the viability of third-party retaliation
clams under Title VII, the Article first discusses the reason why pre-
Thompson courts split on the issue of whether third-party retaliation
violated Title VII or similarly worded statutes, the classes of plaintiffs
who brought third-party retaliation claims, and when, pre-Thompson,
courts were likely to determine whether a relationship was close enough
to warrant protection against third-party retaliation.
III. PROTECTING THIRD PARTIES FROM RETALIATION
A. The Divide: Plain Language Versus Statutory Purposes
1. A Plain Language Problem
At least since the 1980s, the Supreme Court has utilized a method
of statutory interpretation that emphasizes the primacy of statutory text
over one that gives effect to statutory purposes.72 Some earlier cases
under Title VII altogether ignored the statute's language where a literal
interpretation of the text was contrary to the statute's overall purposes or
goals.73 That era is long passed. Justice Thomas recently recognized as
much in his dissent in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education,74
72. See, e.g., Robert J. Gregory, Overcoming Text In An Age of Textualism: A
Practitioner's Guide to Arguing Cases of Statutory Interpretation, 35 AKRON L. REV. 451,
455-56 (2002) (explaining that for the better part of the twentieth-century, "the predominant
view of statutory interpretation emphasized the statute's purpose more so than literal textual
meaning;" although text was relevant because it provided persuasive evidence of legislative
intent, "bare text was not controlling"). According to Gregory, during the purpose-oriented
era of statutory interpretation, "courts were empowered to give effect to the manifest purpose
of a statue even in the face of seemingly unambiguous statutory language." Id. at 457.
Commentators mark the 1980s as the end of that era when so-called "strict constructionists"
were appointed to the bench. See id. at 459. With that change marked the era of statutory
interpretation sometimes referred to as "new textualism," where the text controls above all
else when interpreting a statute. See id. at 459-60. To that end, the statute's text is not an
"aid ... in ascertaining congressional intent ... [but,] it is the end itself." Id. at 460.
73. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 231-55 (1979)
(holding that despite Title VII's explicit prohibition against discrimination on the basis of
race, private employer could adopt affirmative action program for African-American
employees; resting decision on the "spirit" of the statute if not its literal language).
74. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 184-96 (2005) (Thomas, J.,
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where a majority of the Court held that a retaliation claim existed under
Title IX of the Civil Rights Act, although the statute on its face says
nothing about retaliation.75  According to Justice Thomas, the Court's
holding "returns this Court to the days in which it created remedies out
of whole cloth to effectuate its vision of congressional purpose."7 6
The Court's move toward an interpretative model that emphasizes
text over effectuating a statute's purposes has not been lost on the lower
courts. Courts that rejected recognizing third-party retaliation claims
under Title VII or similarly worded statutes reflected the trend of
emphasizing a statute's text to ascertain meaning.n
By its terms, Title VII's anti-retaliation provision bars retaliation
against an employee or applicant who either has opposed an act made
unlawful under Title VII or who, among other things, has participated in
some proceeding filed with an administrative agency to challenge an
alleged discriminatory action.7 ' Engaging in opposition or participation
dissenting).
75. See id at 171 (majority opinion). The statue declares that "[nlo person in the
United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance ..... 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2006). In what might be
described as a creative reading of the statute, however, the Court held that implying a right of
retaliation from the language of the statute was consistent with its text, as retaliation against a
person because that person has complained of sex discrimination is another form of
intentional sex discrimination. See Jackson, 544 U.S. at 173-74. The Court pointed out that
retaliation is an intentional act. See id. at 174. Retaliation, it continued, is discrimination on
the basis of sex because retaliation is an intentional response to the nature of the complaint: an
allegation of sex discrimination. See id.
76. Id. at 195 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
77. See, e.g., Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 567 F.3d 804, 805, 807-09 (6th Cir.
2009) rev'd and remanded, 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011) (holding that Title VII's anti-retaliation
provision is plain in that third parties are not included in the class of person for whom
Congress created a retaliation cause of action because he did not "personally engage[] in
protected activity," saying that it would "not disregard the text of the statute in favor of ...
public policy preferences"); Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 567-69 (3d Cir.
2002) (discussing that ADEA's anti-retaliation provision, which is identical to Title VII's,
plainly does not present third-party retaliation claims, and while reading statute in this manner
conflicts with the purposes of the statute, court would adhere to the text unless doing so would
lead to "a patently absurd result that no rational legislature could have intended"). The court
in Fogleman found that while unconvincing, it was at least "plausible" that Congress
purposely failed to include protection against third party retaliation. Id. at 569. For instance,
Congress may have thought that close associates of the complaining employee would be likely
themselves engage in protected activity on behalf of the employee and in that case would be
protected for their own activity. See id.
78. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
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conduct is considered "protected activity" under Title VII.79 Before the
Court resolved the issue in Thompson, the viability of third-party
retaliation claims under Title VII (or other similarly worded anti-
discrimination statutes) divided the lower courts.8 0  For instance, the
Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits rejected the claims. These courts
held that under a literal reading of the statute, a plaintiff was not deemed
79. See Vaughn v. Epworth Villa, 537 F.3d 1147, 1151 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Laughlin v. Metro. Washington Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 259 (4th Cir. 1998))
("Protected activities fall into two distinct categories: participation or opposition."); Kubicko
v. Ogden Logistics Servs., 181 F.3d 544, 551 (4th Cir. 1999) (explaining that under the anti-
retaliation provision, protected activities fall into either the opposition clause or the
participation clause).
80. See, e.g., Thompson, 567 F.3d at 805-06 (finding that plain language of the statute
did not support claim, as plaintiff did not himself engage in statutorily protected activity, but
had instead asserted a cause of action because of his fianc6e's protected activity); Fogleman,
283 F.3d at 568 (noting that "no consensus has emerged" in the courts concerning third-party
retaliation claims, but rejecting such claims as contrary to the plain language of the ADEA);
id. at 569 (acknowledging that plaintiffs position presents a conflict between the statute's
plain meaning and its underlying policies, but explaining that where such conflict arises, plain
meaning should prevail as long as resulting interpretation is not "patently absurd"); Smith v.
Riceland Foods, Inc., 151 F.3d 813, 819 (8th Cir. 1998) (rejecting plaintiffs argument that he
was protected against retaliation based on fact that employer must have known he aided his
girlfriend with her discrimination claim merely because he lived with girlfriend and employer
treated them as a married couple); id. (rejecting argument that significant other's protected
activity could be imputed to third party so that third party may state a retaliation claim;
plaintiff must allege he opposed a practice made unlawful by Title VII); Holt v. JTM Indus.,
Inc., 89 F.3d 1224, 1226-27 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that husband did not have "standing" to
bring retaliation claim, as he had not engaged in protected activity; plain language of the
statute requires that employee himself engage in protected activity for standing purposes). But
see Gonzalez v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Servs. Fishkill Corr. Facility, 122 F. Supp. 2d 335,
347 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (recognizing third-party retaliation claim, as plaintiff was "the person
actually injured by the type of conduct Title VII seeks to eradicate-retaliation for the filing
of a charge of discrimination); EEOC v. Nalbandian Sales, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1211-
1212 (E.D. Cal. 1998) (explaining that Title VII as remedial legislation should be interpreted
broadly and that to allow employers to engage in third-party reprisals would undermine
Congress' intent to maintain unfettered access to Title VII's remedial scheme and root out
discrimination in employment); Murphy v. Cadillac Rubber & Plastics, Inc., 946 F. Supp.
1108, 1117 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (allowing third-party retaliation claim to proceed and noting that
courts have allowed such claims to effectuate Congress' clear intent in barring retaliation);
DeMedina v. Reinhardt, 444 F. Supp. 573 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 686
F.2d 997 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (recognizing third-party reprisal claim under Title VII because,
although "Congress did not expressly consider the possibility of third-party reprisals[,] . . .the
very clear intent of Congress would be "undermined by" a construction of the statute that fails
to recognize such claims). Cf Wu v. Thomas, 863 F.2d 1543, 1546-48 (11th Cir. 1989)
(finding that although husband failed to file his own EEOC charge, he could pursue judicial
action as he was able to piggy-back on wife's charge; in allowing such claims, court looks to
see whether the gravamen of the complaints are the same; here they were, so there was no
need for husband to also file a charge in the case).
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to have engaged in protected activity merely by being related to or
associated with someone who had engaged in protected conduct." The
statute only prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee
or applicant because he or she, and not someone else such as a close
associate, had engaged in protected activity. 8 2  Thus, the provision
requires that the person retaliated against also be the person who
engaged in the protected activity. As explained below, while courts
rejecting the viability of third-party retaliation claims did so on the basis
of the text of Title VII or kindred statutes, they analyzed the issue in
distinct ways to reach similar results-that the victim of third-party
retaliation could not sue for any harm suffered.
a. Third-Party Retaliation is Not Unlawful Under Title VII or
Kindred Statutes
Some courts altogether rejected the proposition that retaliating
against third parties was proscribed by Title VII or analogously worded
statutes. In other words, according to these courts, an employer did not
violate Title VII by retaliating against an employee because a close
associate of that employee engaged in protected activity. For instance,
in Fogleman v. Mercy Hospital, Inc, the plaintiff alleged that he was
fired after his father sued their employer for age and disability
discrimination.84 The plaintiff sued for retaliation under the Americans
with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act ("ADEA"), alleging that his termination violated the
anti-retaliation provisions of those statutes. In addressing his claims,
the Third Circuit explained that the anti-retaliation provisions of the
ADA and ADEA are "nearly identical" to the anti-retaliation provision
of Title VII and that "precedent interpreting any one of [those] statutes
[was] equally relevant to interpretation of the others."8 It explained that
81. See Thompson, 567 F.3d at 809-11 (collecting and discussing lower court cases).
82. See id at 808.
83. The Third and Eighth Circuits held this view. See Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 568
(rejecting argument that third-party retaliation was actionable under the ADEA); Riceland
Foods, 151 F.3d at 819 (same).
84. See Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 565-66.
85. Id. at 567. The plaintiff also alleged that his discharge violated the anti-retaliation
provisions of Pennsylvania's employment discrimination statute. Id.
86. Id. at 567. The anti-retaliation provisions of several federal employment
discrimination statutes-Title VII, the ADEA and the ADA-are worded similarly. See, e.g.,
Smith v. Specialty Pool Contractors, No. 02:07cvl464, 2008 WL 4410163, at *5 (W.D. Pa.
Sept. 24, 2008) (noting similarity in the language of all three statutes). The Supreme Court
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the plain text of the anti-retaliation provision in the statute requires that
the person retaliated against also be the person who engaged in protected
activity. "By their own terms, then [the anti-retaliation provisions of
Title VII, the ADA and the ADEA] do not make actionable
discrimination against an employee who has not engaged in protected
activity."88  It would appear that under Fogleman, an employer could
retaliate against a third party who did not engage in protected activity
and that Title VII and kindred statutes would afford no relief for the
employer's retaliatory conduct in such instances.8 9
Interestingly, the same plain language rationale that defeated the
plaintiffs third-party retaliation claim in Fogleman allowed the plaintiff
to proceed under a slightly different theory. Specifically, the court
allowed the plaintiffs retaliation claim to proceed on a so-called
"perception theory."90 In addition to alleging that he should be protected
on the basis of his father's protected activity (an argument the court
rejected), the plaintiff also alleged that because of his close association
with his father, his employer perceived or believed that he had assisted
his father with his protected activity and retaliated against the plaintiff
on that basis. 91 The court agreed that, if true, these facts would give rise
to an actionable retaliation claim, explaining:
[W]e read the statutes as directly supporting a perception theory of
discrimination due to the fact that they make it illegal for an employer to
has not always interpreted these acts consistently in every respect. See, e.g., Fed. Express
Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 393 (2008) ("[C]ounsel must be careful not to apply rules
applicable under one statute to a different statute without careful and critical examination.").
As the Fogleman court noted, however, the anti-retaliation provisions of these various statutes
are typically interpreted consistently. See Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 567; see also Holt v. JTM
Indus., Inc., 89 F.3d 1224, 1226 n.1 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Shirley v. Chrysler First, Inc.,
970 F.2d 39, 42 n.5 (5th Cir. 1992)) (noting the similarity between the anti-retaliation
provisions of the ADEA and Title VII and explaining that "cases interpreting" the provisions
of one statute "are frequently relied on in interpreting the [other]").
87. See Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 568.
88. Id.
89. See id. (holding that statute does not make actionable discrimination against a third
party). The court further noted, however, that the ADA contains a second anti-retaliation
provision that is both worded differently and sweeps broader than the provisions contained in
Title VII or the ADEA. See id. at 570. The court held that the plaintiffs third-party
retaliation was cognizable under the second anti-retaliation provision. See Fogleman, 283
F.3d at 570 (explaining that the ADA's second anti-retaliation provision was worded similarly
to the anti-retaliation provision contained in the NLRA, and the court had previously
recognized the viability of third-party retaliation claims under the latter statute).
90. Seeid.at571.
91. Id.
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"discriminate against any individual because such individual has engaged in
protected activity." "Discriminat[ion]" refers to the practice of making a
decision based on a certain criterion, and therefore focuses on the
decisionmaker's subjective intent. What follows, the word "because," specifies
the criterion that the employer is prohibited from using as a basis for
decisionmaking. The laws, therefore, focus on the employer's subjective
reasons for taking adverse action against an employee, so it matters not
whether the reasons behind the employer's discriminatory animus are actually
correct as a factual matter.92
The court further illustrated its point: If, for instance, an employer
refuses to hire an individual because it believes he is a Muslim, the
employer is discriminating on the basis of religion even if the applicant
turns out not to be Muslim.93  According to the court, the relevant
inquiry is that the applicant, "whether Muslim or not, was treated worse
than he otherwise would have been for reasons prohibited by the
statute."94
Likewise, the court explained if the allegations were true in
Fogleman's case, the employer violated the statute because it intended to
discriminate on a basis barred by the statute-an employee's protected
activity-whether or not the employee actually engaged in protected
activity. 9 5  Thus, although the plaintiff may not have engaged in
protected activity, he was able to proceed on his retaliation claim
because his employer believed that he engaged in such behavior and was
motivated to retaliate against him on that basis. Fogleman is unique in
that the court rejected a third-party retaliation claim based on the plain
language of the statute, but allowed the same claim to proceed under a
slightly different theory. In other courts, plaintiffs did not have the same
success.9 6
b. Victims of Third-Party Retaliation Lack Standing to Sue
The Fifth Circuit also rejected the viability of third-party retaliation
claims, but framed the issue in terms of standing to sue. In Holt v. JTM
Industries, Inc., for instance, the plaintiff alleged that he was retaliated
against after his employer received notice that his wife had filed an age
92. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (2006)) (internal citations omitted).
93. Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 571.
94. Id.
95. Id at 571-72.
96. See discussion infra Part III.A. lb-c.
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discrimination charge with the EEOC.97 Although the plaintiff did not
himself engage in protected activity, he contended that he should
nevertheless be protected against retaliation under the ADEA because
his wife's protected activity should have been imputed to him, thus
vesting him with "automatic standing" to sue for retaliation under the
statute.98 The court rejected that argument.
According to the Fifth Circuit, the "plain language" of the statute
only bars employers from retaliating against an employee because that
individual, and not someone else, has engaged in protected activity. 99
The court determined that extending protection to third parties who
themselves had not engaged in protected activity was neither supported
by the language of the statute nor required to "eliminate the risk that an
employer will discriminate against a complaining employee's spouse in
retaliation for the complaining employee's protected activities."' 0 The
court explained that if it bypassed the statute's plain language to protect
persons who never engaged in protected activity on the basis of their
relationships, it would also have to determine the types of relationships
that should be entitled to protection under the statute.101 If it extended
protection to spouses, it might also have to do so for relatives or
friends. 10 2  The court was unwilling to engage in that type of line
drawing. Moreover, the court saw little risk in not granting standing to
spouses and other family members to sue for retaliation.103 Those
individuals, it concluded, would most likely participate in some manner
in their associate's discrimination charge and thus would be protected
because of their own protected activity and would not have to rely on the
activity of another. 104
c. Third-Party Retaliation Might Be Unlawful Under Title VII but
the Victim Has No Right to Sue
In Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, a majority of the
97. Holt v. JTM Indus., Inc., 89 F.3d 1224, 1226 (5th Cir. 1996).
98. Id.
99. See id.
100. Id.
101. Holt, 89 F.3d at 1227 ("If we hold that spouses have automatic standing to sue their
employers for retaliation, the question then becomes, which other persons should have
automatic standing to guard against the risk of retaliation?").
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. Id.
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Sixth Circuit sitting en banc took yet another approach to address the
issue. 05 The majority of the en banc court disagreed with the Fifth
Circuit's framing of the issue as one of standing and determined that
whether one has standing to sue under Title VII is addressed by a
provision other than the anti-retaliation provision.106 The court also did
not go so far as to hold that an employer's retaliatory act is never
actionable under Title VII where an employee has not himself engaged
in protected conduct, thus seeming to reject the reasoning of the Third
Circuit in Fogleman and the Eighth Circuit.'0o
The Sixth Circuit held, however, that based on the plain language
of the anti-retaliation provision, only a plaintiff who actually engaged in
protected conduct had a cause of action for retaliation under the
statute. 08  Thus, Thompson, the plaintiff who alleged third-party
retaliation, could not sue under the statute for whatever injury he
suffered as a result of his discharge, as he did not engage in protected
activity. 109 The court suggested (although it did not expressly hold) that
Thompson's fianc6e who actually engaged in protected activity may
have been able to sue for the adverse action against Thompson." 0
While the approach taken by the Sixth Circuit may have surface
appeal, upon closer inspection it would fail to protect individuals in
Thompson's position. First, the person who engages in protected
activity (i.e., Thompson's fianc6e) may choose not to pursue a claim on
behalf of the party who suffered injury as a result of that protected
activity-in this case Thompson. An employee in Thompson's position,
therefore, would be disadvantaged because it would put him at the mercy
105. 567 F.3d 804, 805 (6th Cir. 2009), rev'd and remanded, 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011).
106. Id. at 810 n.4 ("To the extent the [Fifth Circuit in] Holt [] characterized the viability
of the plaintiffs claim as an issue of 'standing,' rather than whether the prima facie elements
of a cause of action had been established, we disagree with its analysis.").
107. See Smith v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 151 F.3d 813, 819 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that
Title VII does not bar employer from taking adverse action against an employee because of
the protected activity of a spouse or significant other).
108. Thompson, 567 F.3d at 809 (holding that district court ruled correctly that
Thompson failed to establish prima facie case of retaliation, as he did not allege that he had
engaged in any sort of protected activity).
109. Id.
110. See id. at 816 n.10 (noting that the parties agreed that, "if Miriam Regalado believed
that she was the intended target of retaliation for engaging in her protected activity, she could
have filed a retaliation action ... and, under Burlington Northern, defendant's termination of
Thompson potentially could be deemed an 'adverse employment action against her"').
Interestingly, the Sixth Circuit did not hold that Regalado or someone in her position could
sue, but the parties agreed that she could do so. See id.
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of another person deciding to avenge his wrong. Should his fianc6e
choose not to pursue a claim, Thompson would be out of a job and have
no recourse. Moreover, assuming for the sake of argument that
Thompson's flanc6e chose to file suit on his behalf, it is unlikely that a
court would hold that she would have standing to seek relief on his
behalf for the injuries he sustained as a result of his discharge, thereby
frustrating the goals of Title VII's remedial provisions-to make persons
whole for injuries sustained as a result of unlawful employment
discrimination.'
In sum, however the issue is framed, the en banc court in Thompson
joined those circuits that held the anti-retaliation provision served as a
bar to third-party reprisal claims. As explained below, not all courts
adopted this approach.
2. Statutory Purposes Trump Text
Because allowing third-party reprisals undermines the statutory
purposes of Title VII, some courts were forgiving about what they saw
as the limitation of the anti-retaliation provision's plain language.1 12 The
111. See, e.g., De Medina v. Reinhardt, 444 F. Supp. 573, 580-81 (D.D.C. 1978) (finding
that husband who engaged in protected activity "would certainly not be in a position to seek
back pay and/or retroactive promotion based on his spouse's employment denial . . . . [U]nless
plaintiff herself is permitted to seek relief based on the denial of her employment application,
the 'make whole' purpose of Title VII would be frustrated"); see also Thompson, 567 F.3d at
822 n.5 (Moore, J., dissenting) (explaining that Thompson would have to sue on his own
behalf to be made whole under Title VII, as "it is unclear whether [Thompson's fiancee]
would be able to sue to have Thompson reinstated [or otherwise] completely remedy
Thompson's harm"). Cf Smith v. Frye, 488 F.3d 263, 272-73 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that
son who engaged in protected activity under First Amendment lacked standing to sue for
injuries his mother suffered after she was fired because of his activity; son had no claim based
on argument that his First Amendment rights were chilled as a result of retaliatory act visited
upon his mother, as any injury from his mother's discharge flowed to her and not to her son).
112. The courts adopting this approach were primarily, although not exclusively, district
courts. See, e.g., Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 520 F.3d 644, 647 (6th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586 (1983)) (holding that
prohibition on employer retaliation only when directed at individual who conducted the
protected activity "would defeat the plain purpose of the statute"), rev'd en banc, 567 F.3d
804 (6th Cir. 2009), rev'd and remanded, 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011); Gonzalez v. New York State
Dep't of Corr. Servs. Fishkill Corr. Facility, 122 F. Supp. 2d 335, 347 (N.D.N.Y. 2000)
(recognizing third-party retaliation claim, as plaintiff was the person actually injured by the
type of conduct Title VII seeks to eradicate-retaliation for the filing of a charge of
discrimination); EEOC v. Nalbandian Sales, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1211-12 (E.D. Cal.
1998) (explaining that Title VII as remedial legislation should be interpreted broadly and that
allowing employers to engage in third-party reprisals would undermine Congress' intent to
maintain unfettered access to Title VII's remedial scheme and root out discrimination in
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primary purpose of Title VII's anti-retaliation provision is to maintain
"unfettered access" to Title VII's remedial scheme.1 13 There may be no
greater way of disincentivizing employees from reporting discrimination
than if the employees fear reprisal against a family member or some
other close associate.' 14 Directly going after the individual who engaged
in protected activity would open an employer up to a retaliation claim.
By targeting that individual's close associate, however, the employer
could accomplish its goal indirectly."' Congress did not likely
contemplate such a loophole in the statute.' 16
One early case that recognized the tension between Title VII's anti-
retaliation provision's language and the purposes of the statute was De
Medina v. Reinhardt.' In De Medina, the plaintiff alleged that she was
denied employment after her husband, who worked for the same
employer, complained of discrimination against minorities in the
workplace.118 The defendant moved for summary judgment on several
bases, including that Title VII's anti-retaliation provision only protects
an individual because of his or her own protected activity.1 19 In response
to the defendant's motion, the court explained:
employment); Murphy v. Cadillac Rubber & Plastics, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 1108 (W.D.N.Y.
1996) (allowing third-party retaliation claim to proceed and noting that courts have allowed
such claims to effectuate Congress' clear intent in barring retaliation); De Medina, 444 F.
Supp. at 580 (recognizing third-party reprisal claim under Title VII; although "Congress did
not expressly consider the possibility of third-party reprisals . . . the very clear intent of
Congress would be undermined by" a construction of the statute that fails to recognize such
claims).
113. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 64 (2006) (quoting
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997)).
114. See Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 568-69 (3d Cir. 2002).
115. See Nalbandian, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 1210.
116. Id. (explaining that it is unlikely that Congress intended to thwart Title VII's broad
aims by allowing third party reprisals). Commentators who addressed the issue prior to
Thompson also favored recognizing third-party retaliation claims. Carrie B. Temm, Third-
Party Retaliation Claims: Where to Draw the Line, 54 U. KAN. L. REv. 865, 865-66 (2006)
(noting the then current circuit split and advocating for recognizing third-party reprisal claims
based on relationship of the third-party and associate); Anita G. Schausten, Retaliation
Against Third Parties: A Potential Loophole in Title VII's Discrimination Protection, 37 J.
MARSHALL L. REv. 1313, 1313 (2004) (addressing circuit split and advocating for broad
reading of anti-retaliation provisions to recognize third party retaliation claims); see Gregory,
supra note 72, at 454 (arguing that even under Supreme Court's plain language approach to
statutory interpretation, an argument may be made that anti-retaliation provisions protect
against third-party retaliation).
117. 444 F.Supp. 573, 580 (D.D.C. 1978).
118. See id. at 575.
119. Id. at 580.
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While the language of the section indicates that Congress did not expressly
consider the possibility of third-party reprisals i.e., discrimination against one
person because of a friend's or relative's protected activities the very clear
intent of Congress would be undermined by the construction defendant
suggests. In enacting [the anti-retaliation provision], Congress unmistakably
intended to ensure that no person would be deterred from exercising his rights
under Title VII by threat of discriminatory retaliation. Since tolerance of third-
party reprisals would, no less than the tolerance of direct reprisals, deter
persons from exercising their protected rights under Title VII, the Court must
conclude . . . that [the anti-retaliation provision protects against third-party
retaliation claims] .120
In those courts that permitted third-party retaliation claims, like the
district court in DeMedina, another challenging issue often arose: Who
would be protected against such retaliation? That issue survives
Thompson.
B. The Relationship Question
1. Protecting the Close Associate
One might assume that an employee who knows that her complaints
about discrimination might cause another coworker to undergo a tougher
time in the workplace would deter her from engaging in protected
activity. Many courts that recognized third-party retaliation prior to
Thompson, however, did not adopt such an expansive approach to
dealing with third-party retaliation. Retaliation is an intentional act. 12 1
In the context of third-party retaliation, the plaintiff must prove that the
employer's motivation for taking the adverse action against the plaintiff
was to retaliate against another employee who engaged in protected
activity. This theory has traditionally presupposed that the two
employees have a close, intimate relationship.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit explained this
rationale for recognizing third-party retaliation claims in NLRB v.
Advertisers Manufacturing Co.122 There, the National Labor Relations
Board ("NLRB") found that an employee was fired because her son had
120. Id. (emphasis added).
121. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 173-74 (2005) ("Retaliation is,
by definition, an intentional act. It is a form of 'discrimination' because the complainant is
being subjected to differential treatment.").
122. See 823 F.2d 1086, 1090-91 (7th Cir. 1987).
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been elected chief steward of the local union. 12 3  In response to the
employer's argument that third-party retaliation was not unlawful under
the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), the Seventh Circuit stated
that had the employer fired the son directly, it would have
unquestionably violated the NLRA.124 The court explained that firing
the steward's mother was an equally effective means of punishing him
because, "[i]f he loves his mother, [her discharge] had to hurt him as
well as her."1 25 As the court's rationale implies, third-party retaliation
typically assumes that a close, intimate relationship exists between the
plaintiff and the person who engaged in protected activity. The
employer is motivated to punish the employee who engaged in protected
activity by targeting someone for whom the employee has strong
feelings.12 6  One judge has explained that, "[w]here the relationship
between the two employees is . . . attenuated, it will be more difficult
[for the alleged victim of third-party retaliation] to prove this unlawful
motivation."l27
Many employers appear to make assumptions about the affinity
between certain employees when deciding who to target for third-party
retaliation. Cases involving third-party retaliation overwhelmingly have
involved allegations that employers acted adversely against an employee
whose spouse,' 28 relative, 129 or significant other1 30 had engaged in
123. Id. at 1088.
124. Id. at 1088-89.
125. Id. at 1089.
126. Advertisers Mfg. Co., 823 F.2d at 1088.
127. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 567 F.3d 804, 829 (6th Cir. 2009) (White, J.,
dissenting), rev'd and remanded, 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011); see also O'Connell v. Isocor Corp.,
56 F. Supp. 2d 649, 654 (E.D. Va. 1999) ("[T]he third-party retaliation doctrine does not
cover two people whose only connection is that they happen[] to work for the same
company.").
128. See, e.g., Holt v. JTM Indus., Inc., 89 F.3d 1224, 1226 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that
third party retaliation was not actionable under the statute; plaintiff lacked standing to sue for
retaliation under the ADEA, which court interpreted consistently with Title VII, as plaintiff
did not engage in protected activity but was relying for his claim on the protected activity of
his spouse); Elsensohn v. Parish of St. Tammany, No. 06-11393, 2007 WL 1799684, at *3-4
(E.D. La. June 19, 2007) (rejecting third-party retaliation claim under the Family Medical
Leave Act ("FMLA") where husband alleged denial of promotions, shift changes, lost pay,
and ability to obtain supplemental employment were because his wife had sued under the
FMLA), affd sub nom., Elsensohn v. St. Tammany Parish Sheriffs Office, 530 F.3d 368 (5th
Cir. 2008); Shoecraft v. Univ. of Houston-Victoria, No. Civ. A. V-03-85, 2006 WL 870432, at
*2-3 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2006) (rejecting wife's retaliation claim under Title VII challenging
a reduction in force, which adversely affected her; claim failed as wife alleged that her
employer retaliated against her because of her husband's protected activity in another
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protected activity. Those courts holding that third-party retaliation was
cognizable under Title VII or a similarly worded statute pre-Thompson
did not typically question whether employees involved in these
relationships were close enough to draw the inference that an employer
might target one employee to harm the other.'3 1 Indeed, some courts
discrimination suit against their employer; "mere existence of a marital relationship between
[an] employee engaged in protected activity and his/her spouse is not a sufficient connection
to impute protected activity to that spouse") (citations omitted); Mutts v. S. Conn. State Univ.,
No. 3:04 CV 1746(MRK), 2006 WL 1806179, at *8-11 (D. Conn. June 28, 2006) (rejecting
claim where wife alleged employer took various adverse actions against her, including
refusing to accommodate her disability, allowing a supervisor to make derogatory comments
about her health and interracial marriage, and assigning her an "unreasonable amount of
work" as a consequence of her husband's protected activity), affd, 242 F. App'x 725 (2d Cir.
2007); Singh v. Green Thumb Landscaping, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1131-32, 1138 (M.D.
Fla. 2005) (rejecting retaliation claim where husband alleged he was terminated because of
wife's protected activity of complaining about sex discrimination).
129. Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 564 (3d Cir. 2002) (rejecting third-
party reprisal theory where son alleged he was terminated as a result of his father's age
discrimination claim against their employer); EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d
1240, 1242, 1247 (D.N.M. 2008) (finding that adult son and daughter did not engage in
protected activity and could not rely on protected activity of their mother who was also an
employee with defendant to challenge defendant's refusal to hire them); Rainer v. REFCO,
Inc., 464 F. Supp. 2d 742, 745, 751 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (holding that son could not state a
retaliation claim based on his termination by relying on his mother's protected activity);
Genao v. New York City Dept. of Parks & Recreation, No. 04 CV 2893 JG, 2005 WL
1220899, at *2, *6 (E.D.N.Y. May 23, 2005) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted) (rejecting argument that plaintiff could state a claim for retaliation based on
his brother's protected activity; also finding pre-Burlington that the adverse actions plaintiff
complained of were not actionable, as they were not "materially adverse change[s] in the
terms and conditions of [his] employment"), affd, 178 F. App'x 42 (2d Cir. 2006); Higgins v.
TJX Companies, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 2d 122, 123 (D. Me. 2004) (rejecting retaliatory refusal to
hire claim, as plaintiff did not engage in protected activity but sought to rely on the fact that
his cousin, a former employee of the same company, had previously sued the company for
sexual harassment); Horizon Holdings, L.L.C. v. Genmar Holdings, Inc., 241 F. Supp. 2d
1123, 1142-44 (D. Kan. 2002) (rejecting plaintiff s retaliatory termination claim, as he did not
engage in protected activity but sought to rely on the protected activity of his wife and father-
in-law, who were also employees of the company).
130. See Thompson, 567 F.3d at 809; Smith v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 151 F.3d 813, 819
(8th Cir. 1998) (rejecting plaintiffs claim where plaintiffs live-in girlfriend and co-employee
filed a charge of discrimination and plaintiff alleged he was terminated as a result; refusing to
allow retaliation claim where one's "spouse or significant other" but not the plaintiff engages
in protected activity); EEOC v. Bojangles Restaurants, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 2d 320, 324, 326-27
(M.D.N.C. 2003) (refusing to read statute to recognize third-party retaliation claims where
plaintiff's fiancde engaged in protected conduct and plaintiff alleged she was terminated as a
result).
131. See, e.g., Spouse: Wegeng v. Papa John's USA, Inc., No. 05-636-GPM, 2006 WL
1207259, at *1 (S.D. Ill. May 2, 2006) (allowing third-party retaliation claim by husband);
Bolin v. Oklahoma Conference of the United Methodist Church, 397 F. Supp. 2d 1293, (N.D.
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characterized third-party retaliation claims as viable only where a close
relationship and in some cases only a familial relationship existed
between coworkers. 3 2
Alleging a close, intimate relationship, however, has never been the
sine qua non of a successful third-party retaliation claim. An intimate
relationship might strengthen the inference that the employer acted with
a retaliatory motive, 3 3 but it does not mean the employer actually did so.
In any Title VII retaliation claim, a plaintiff must plead and prove
causation, that is, that the employer acted adversely against an employee
because of his or her protected activity.134 In the context of third-party
Okla. 2005) (holding that wife presented sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on
third-party retaliation claim); Gonzalez v. New York State Dep't of Corr. Servs. Fishkill Corr.
Facility, 122 F. Supp. 2d 335 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding that wife had standing to sue for third-
party retaliation under Title VII); Murphy v. Cadillac Rubber & Plastics, Inc., 946 F. Supp.
1108, 1118 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (denying motion to dismiss as to husband of employee who
engaged in protected activity; third-party retaliation permissible under Title VII if there is a
causal connection between protected activity of one employee and adverse action against
another); DeMedina v. Reinhardt, 444 F. Supp. 573, 581 (D.D.C. 1978) (holding that third-
party retaliation claims were viable under Title VII and wife stated claim where she alleged
discrimination for husband's protected activity); Other relative: Gore v. Trustees of Deerfield
Acad., 385 F. Supp. 2d 65, 73-74 (D. Mass. 2005) (third-party retaliation claim by daughter
for parent's protected activity survived motion for summary judgment); Genao, 2005 WL
1220899, at *8-9 (claim by brother of employee who engaged in protected activity failed
because he failed to causation between protected activity and adverse action); Thomas v. Am.
Horse Shows Assoc., Inc., No. 97-CV-3513 JG, 1999 WL 287721, at *12-14 (E.D.N.Y. Apr.
23, 1999) (finding that sister had standing to sue for third-party retaliation), affd, 205 F.3d
1324 (2d Cir. 2000); E.E.O.C. v. Nalbandian Sales, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1212 (E.D. Cal.
1998) (finding that employee stated claim where he was allegedly not hired because of sister's
protected activity); Romantic partner: Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 520 F.3d 644 (6th
Cir. 2008) (holding that third-party retaliation is cognizable under Title VII and prevented
employer from discriminating against employee because of protected activity of fiancde),
rev'd en banc, 567 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2009) (rejecting third-party retaliation claim based on
plain language of statute), rev'd and remanded, 131 S. Ct. 865 (2011) (holding that third-party
retaliation is cognizable under Title VII); Sweeney v. City of Ladue, No. 4:92CV01014 JCH,
1993 WL 726237, at *2-5 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 31, 1993) (finding that, although third-party
retaliation typically involves claims by employees for a spouse's protected activity, a dating
relationship would qualify as an "association" protected under a state statute that is worded
and interpreted similarly to Title VII; holding, however, that retaliation claim by police officer
failed because he could not show causal connection between his discharge and the protected
activity of his girlfriend), affd, 25 F.3d 702 (8th Cir. 1994), abrogated by, Torgerson v. City
of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031 (8th Cir. 2011).
132. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
133. See discussion supra Part III.A.1.a.
134. A prima facie case of retaliation requires a showing that the plaintiff engaged in
protected activity and suffered a materially adverse action as a result of that protected activity.
See, e.g., Vera v. McHugh, 622 F.3d 17, 32 (1st Cir. 2010) (setting forth elements of prima
facie case); see also Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 570 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing DiCarlo
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retaliation, a plaintiff must plead and prove that an alleged adverse
action was the result of an associate's protected activity and not some
other non-retaliatory reason.13 5  Despite a close, intimate relationship,
courts have not hesitated to render judgment in favor of an employer
because of an employee's inability to rebut an employer's showing that
it had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for taking an adverse
action and not because of the protected activity of a coworker.13 6
Nevertheless, although an intimate relationship alone has not been
tantamount to a successful third-party retaliation claim, plaintiffs
involved in such relationships have fared better than other employees
v. Potter, 358 F.3d 408, 420 (6th Cir. 2004)) (showing a causal connection between the
protected activity and the adverse employment action is a required element of a prima facie
case of retaliation).
135. See Ohio EEOC v. Ohio Edison Co., 7 F.3d 541, 546 (6th Cir. 1993) (explaining
that with respect to retaliation claims involving multiple employees, a complaint should
indicate causal connection between protected activity and the adverse action, "[o]therwise,
any time that an adverse employment action is taken by an employer against an employee at
the same time a second employee is engaging in protected activity, the first employee could
allege retaliation"); see also Rodriguez v. Ohio State Univ., No. 2:08-cv-00139, 2011 WL
335854, at *14 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 31, 2011) (explaining that "[a] plaintiff establishes a prima
facie case of retaliation by showing: (1) participation .. . in a protected activity known to the
defendant; (2) an employment action adverse to the plaintiff; and (3) a causal connection
between the protected activity and the adverse employment action").
136. Webber v. Christus Schumpert Health Sys., No. 10-1177, 2011 WL 3880398, at *9-
*10 (W.D. La. Sept. 2, 2011) (holding that Thompson was distinguishable from the instant
case as the plaintiff failed to allege that her employer's adverse action taken against her was to
retaliate against a coworker with whom the plaintiff claimed she had a close relationship);
Rodriguez, 2011 WL 335854, at *14-15 (noting that Thompson now allows for third-party
retaliation claims and allowing plaintiff to state a claim for third-party retaliation by relying
on the protected activity of her "significant other," but ultimately granting employer's motion
for summary judgment as she failed to show causal connection between the protected activity
and the alleged adverse actions); Zuk v. Onondaga County, No. 5:07-CV-732 (GTS/GJD),
2010 WL 3909524, at *18 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2010) (finding that plaintiffs third-party
retaliation claim failed for numerous reasons including that there were legitimate reasons for
the adverse actions about which he complained); Genao v. New York City Dept. of Parks and
Recreation, No. 04 CV 2893 JG, 2005 WL 1220899, at *6-8 (E.D.N.Y. May 23, 2005)
(granting employer's motion to dismiss claim by employee who alleged retaliation because his
brother engaged in protected activity; plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to show
causation between protected activity and adverse action); Thomas v. Am. Horse Shows Ass'n,
Inc., No. 97-CV-3513 JG, 1999 WL 287721, at *12-14 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 1999) (granting
summary judgment in favor of employer where plaintiff failed to allege facts showing a causal
connection between her failure to be promoted and her sister's protected activity), aff'd,
Thomas v. Am. Horse Shows Ass'n, Inc., No. 99-7662, 2000 WL 232041 (2d Cir. Jan. 25,
2000) (summary order); Sweeney v. City of Ladue, No. 4:92CV010144 JCH, 1993 WL
726237, at *4-5 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 31, 1993) (granting motion for summary judgment on third-
party retaliation claim where police officer failed to show a causal connection between his
discharge and the protected activity of his girlfriend).
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bringing such claims.
2. Protecting More Distant Associates
a. Close Friends and the Perception Theory Revisited
Not all claims involving non-family members failed prior to
Thompson; nor should they have. Many meaningful relationships, from
marriages to friendships, form at the workplace. Indeed, adults who
work full-time spend a lot of time at work'37 and, while workplaces vary,
many of those people spend a great deal of their working time
interacting with coworkers.' 38  Cynthia Estlund has stated that the
physical proximity and interaction between coworkers are two reasons
why employees develop affinity for one another. She explains:
Employees tend to see the same people day after day over a significant period
of time, and often work closely with them in carrying out their jobs.
Coworkers interact not only in doing the job itself but also at the beginning and
end of the workday, during breaks, in locker rooms and restrooms, and at the
proverbial water cooler. Opportunities for this sort of interchange vary
[according to workplace].... For those who work full-time, most discussions
of current issues and events, movies, sports, popular culture, and personal
relationships outside the family are with coworkers. Through these repeated
and frequent interactions, coworkers often learn about each others' lives and
develop feelings of affection, mutual understanding, empathy, and loyalty.'
3 9
Professor Estlund does not claim that proximity or interaction alone
fosters deep relationships among employees.14 0  Another important
factor, for instance, is the process of working together to get the job
done, which requires, at a minimum, "cooperative and constructive
relations."' 4 1 Similar to Professor Estlund's findings, Patria M. Sias,
whose research focuses on relationships in organizations, also found that
proximity and working together on shared tasks foster close
137. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the
Law, 89 GEO. L. J. 1, 8 (2000).
138. See id. at 9.
139. Id.
140. See id. at 9-13 (noting, for example, that relationships are fostered because
coworkers must work together to get the job done, which further fosters trust among
employees working cooperatively together; citing several other complex factors that together
breed affinity among coworkers).
141. See Estlund, supra note 137, at 9.
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relationships at work among peers.142
Considering the daily interaction among many coworkers, which
may result in sharing everything from thoughts about the latest Harry
Potter movie to one's personal relationship, it is at least plausible that an
employer might target one coworker to punish another for complaining
about discrimination because of the close bonds that coworkers can
form. Courts have recognized as much. Generally, third-party
retaliation claims involving non-related or romantically linked
coworkers have been most successful in two scenarios: (1) where the
relationship concerned was between "close" friends;143 or (2) where the
facts indicated that because coworkers associated with one another, the
employer believed that the plaintiff actually participated in a coworker's
discrimination complaint and retaliated against the plaintiff on the basis
of that belief.144 Fogleman, discussed supra,145 falls in this latter
category.
b. "Just Friends" and Other Coworkers
Employees who alleged that they were victims of third-party
retaliation and were "just friends" (as opposed to "close friends"), or
who had only a professional relationship with the employee who
142. See PATRICIA M. SIAS, ORGANIZING RELATIONSHIPS: TRADITIONAL AND
EMERGING PERSPECTIVES ON WORKPLACE RELATIONSHIPS 105 (2009) (describing physical
proximity and shared tasks as important contributors to workplace friendship development
among peers).
143. See, e.g., Reich v. Cambridgeport Air Sys., Inc., 26 F.3d 1187, 1188-89 (1st Cir.
1994) (holding that employer violated Occupational Health and Safety Act by firing employee
because of the "special friend[ship]" he shared with another employee who had engaged in
protected activity; plaintiffs were "particularly close friends" and management knew it); Craig
v. Suburban Cablevision, Inc., 660 A.2d 505, 506, 508 (N.J. 1995) (holding that under state
anti-discrimination statute, plaintiffs had standing to assert retaliation claim after being fired
for being "close friends" with their supervisor who had sued the company for sex
discrimination; plaintiffs showed that entire "department was small and cohesive," which
caused employer to retaliate against the entire department; further, employer perceived that
employees supported their supervisor in her discrimination claim).
144. EEOC v. Union Bank of Arizona, No. Civ. 75-257, 1976 WL 1727, at *3 (D. Ariz.
Jan. 20, 1976) (holding that employer unlawfully retaliated against plaintiff because it
believed she had filed charge of discrimination or aided others who did so because of
plaintiffs association with employees known to have filed charges); see also Craig, 660 A.2d
at 506, 508 (holding that under state anti-discrimination statute, plaintiffs had standing to
assert retaliation claim after being fired in connection with their supervisor's discrimination
complaint as, as among other things, their employer perceived that they supported their
supervisor in her discrimination claim).
145. See discussion supra Part III.A.1.a.
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engaged in protected activity, often pursued retaliation claims in vain.
Many courts rejected such claims because they restricted third-party
retaliation to instances involving close relatives or at least close friends.
In Whychock v Coordinated Systems, for instance, the court rejected
the idea that third-party retaliation could ever apply to employees who
were not "close relatives of an individual who did in fact engage in
protected activity." 146 According to the court, the plaintiff admitted that
she and the employee who had engaged in protected activity were
"merely friends," although their relationship extended beyond the
workplace. 147 Indeed, the employer claimed that it terminated the
plaintiff, in part, because she violated confidentiality rules by speaking
with her "mere friend" and his wife on several occasions about the
friend's medical condition. 148
Similarly, in Freeman v. Barnhart, the court rejected a third-party
retaliation claim where the plaintiff alleged that she was fired for
associating with other employees who had engaged in protected
activity. 14 9 While the court primarily rested its decision on the plain
language of the statute-an issue that doomed these claims in many
courts-it also indicated that, to the extent it might have been persuaded
to recognize such claims, it would not have done so based on the
relationship alleged. According to the court, there was nothing special
about plaintiffs friendship with her coworkers who had engaged in
protected activity, as she admitted that she associated no more with these
individuals than she did with her other workplace friends. 5
If plaintiffs were often unprotected on the basis of their mere
friendships, purely professional relationships fared worse. For example,
in Millstein v. Henske, the D.C. Court of Appeals rejected a claim where
a plaintiff alleged that she was terminated for the protected activity of a
coworker.'51 According to the court, third-party retaliation only extends
to family or perhaps close friends of the individual who engaged in
146. No. Civ. A. 01-3873, 2003 WL 927704, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 2003) (rejecting
argument that third-party retaliation could ever apply to employees who were not "close
relatives of individual who did in fact engage in protected activity"; noting that, in any event,
plaintiff and person who engaged in protected activity "were merely friends, who spoke at
work when they saw each other, and spoke outside of work on occasion").
147. See id. at *6.
148. See id. at *1-2.
149. No. C 06-04900 JSW, 2008 WL 744827, *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2008).
150. See id. at *7.
151. Millstein v. Henske, 722 A.2d 850 (D.C. 1999).
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protected activity.1 52 Thus, the court found it irrelevant that the plaintiff
and her coworker, who earlier had complained of sex discrimination, had
a twelve-to-thirteen year "professional relationship." 5 3
Although the plaintiffs in the aforementioned cases may not have
prevailed on their third-party claims for other reasons, such as a failure
to show causation,154 the point is that such claims failed for no reason
other than because the relationship between the employees was
considered too attenuated for purposes of a viable third-party retaliation
claim. 55 In sum, most third-party retaliation claims have involved
family members and romantic partners, which may be unsurprising
considering the affection presupposed to exist in such relationships. 15 6
Other coworkers received protection against third-party retaliation prior
to Thompson, but generally only where the facts demonstrated a
particularly close relationship or where the employer believed the
plaintiff participated in the protected activity of a coworker because of
their association.
As explained below, the material adversity standard that Thompson
adopted will determine who warrants protection against third-party
retaliation and under what circumstances. It rejects the argument that
third-party retaliation may arise only in the context of an intimate or
family relationship.
152. See id. at 854-55.
153. See id.
154. See discussion supra notes 134-136 and accompanying text.
155. See, e.g., DeHart v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, 214 Fed.Appx., 437, 441,
n.4 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that court did not need to determine whether causation existed
between adverse action and coworker's protected activity because plain language of the
statute barred third-party retaliation claims altogether; even assuming that court were to adopt
the holding of one of the courts that recognized such claim, those courts did not "extend
standing as far as" plaintiff urged since she failed to allege that family relationship existed
between herself and the other coworker who engaged in protected activity); see also Wychock
v. Coordinated Health Sys., No. Civ. A. 01-3873, 2003 WL 927704, at *6 & n.5 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 4, 2003) (finding that, although plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate a
dispute of material fact regarding whether the employer terminated her for the reasons it
proffered, her third-party retaliation claim failed because she alleged no familial relationship
with the coworker who engaged in protected activity; thus, court had no reason to address
other elements of her retaliation claim). But see Millstein, 722 A.2d at 855-56 (even
assuming arguendo that court would impute protected activity of one employee to another,
plaintiff also failed to show a causal connection between her adverse action and her
coworker's protected activity).
156. See generally NLRB v. Advertisers Mfg. Co., 823 F.2d 1086 (7th Cir. 1987)
(finding that firing employee's mother would harm mother and her son as well if he loved his
mother).
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C. The Sixth Circuit: A Problem ofLanguage and "Irrelevant" Law
Thompson represents a classic third-party reprisal case. Eric
Thompson was an employee at North American Stainless ("NAS"),
where his fianc6e, Miriam Regalado, also worked. 57 During her tenure
at NAS, Regalado filed a charge with the EEOC, alleging that she had
been discriminated against on the basis of her sex.15' The EEOC
notified NAS of Miriam's charge and approximately three weeks later
NAS fired Thompson.159
Much of the litigation in the lower court turned on the issue of
whether an employee such as Thompson could be protected on the basis
of the protected activity of his fianc6e, Regalado.160 As to that issue, the
district court granted NAS's motion for summary judgment, finding that
Title VII's anti-retaliation provision did not protect a plaintiff in
Thompson's position who did not himself engage in protected
activity.
While a panel of the Sixth Circuit originally reversed the district
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of NAS, the court decided
to hear the case en banc and reversed the panel.162 Thompson yielded
five separate opinions: the majority, one concurrence, and three dissents
that argued for various reasons that Thompson should be allowed to
proceed with his third-party retaliation claim. 6 3 Relying on "the plain
language" of the statute, a majority of the en banc court held that
Thompson had no cause of action under Title VII's anti-retaliation
provision because he did not engage in protected activity.'64
157. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 867 (2011).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 435 F. Supp. 2d 633, 638 (E.D. Ky. 2006).
162. See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 567 F.3d 804, 805-06 (6th Cir. 2009).
163. See id at 816 (Rogers, J., concurring in the judgment) (agreeing that Thompson had
no cause of action under the anti-retaliation provision but for slightly different reasons than
the majority opinion); id. at 818 (Martin, J., dissenting) (arguing that Thompson should be
allowed to argue on remand how the Supreme Court's recent retaliation decisions, particularly
Crawford v. Metro. Gov't, 555 U.S. 271 (2009), might support a third-party retaliation claim);
id at 820 (Moore, J., dissenting) (relying, among other things, on the broad purposes of the
anti-retaliation provision as a means to recognize the viability of third-party retaliation);
Thompson, 567 F.3d at 827-28 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that Burlington indeed
supports the viability of third-party retaliation claims and that Title VII's enforcement
provision allows Thompson to sue for the adverse treatment that he alleged he suffered).
164. Id. at 808 (majority decision) ("By application of the plain language of the statute,
Thompson is not included in the class of persons for whom Congress created a retaliation
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1. The Irrelevance ofBurlington165
According to the majority of the en banc court, the Court's holding
in Burlington did not aid Thompson.16 6  That decision, it explained,
addressed only the scope of the anti-retaliation provision and not the
separate issue of whether that provision permits an employee who did
not engage in protected activity to bring a retaliation claim. 16 7 While
Burlington undoubtedly addressed the scope of the anti-retaliation
provision, the en banc court gave short shrift to the fact that under
Burlington's material adversity standard, Thompson's discharge may
have been adverse to Regalado as well. Certainly, if removing Sheila
White's forklift duties in Burlington (one of the adverse actions alleged
in that case) would dissuade her from engaging in protected activity,' 68
then firing her fianc6 would likely do so as well. The court did not
engage in any extensive analysis with regard to Burlington's potential
effect on Regalado. Rather, it stated in a footnote that "[a]ll of the
parties agree[]" that Regalado might be able to sue if she believed
Thompson's firing was "an 'adverse employment action' against her."l 69
The court did not opine on whether it agreed with the parties.17
2. Title VII's Enforcement Provision
Apart from Title VII's anti-retaliation provision, the court also gave
short shrift to the enforcement provision which, by its terms, governs
who may sue for a statutory violation. Title VII's enforcement provision
would play as big a role as the anti-retaliation provision in the Court's
later discussion of third-party retaliation.
Title VII's enforcement provision provides that a civil action may
be brought by a "person claiming to be aggrieved" by an "alleged
cause of action because he personally did not oppose an unlawful practice, make a charge,
testify, assist, or participate in an investigation.").
165. Because the Supreme Court would ultimately rely on Burlington to recognize the
viability of third-party retaliation, this Article briefly discusses the en banc court's approach
to Burlington, and why the lower court held that even if Thompson's termination violated
Title VII, he had no right to sue because of it.
166. See id. at 815.
167. Id.
168. See Burlington v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68-69 (2006).
169. Thompson, 567 F.3d at 816 n.10.
170. Id. Moreover, as explained earlier, it is far from clear whether Regalado could have
sought all the relief that Thompson could have requested for himself had he sued on his own
behalf-a result that would have frustrated the "make whole" purposes of Title VII's remedial
provisions. See supra note Ill and accompanying discussion.
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unlawful employment practice."' 7' Thompson clearly alleged that an
unlawful employment practice had occurred when he was fired because
of Regalado's protected activity and that he was aggrieved because he
lost his job. The court held, however, that this provision had nothing to
do with whether Thompson could bring a lawsuit under Title VII. 72 In a
somewhat confusing analysis of the provision (which the Court would
later reject), the majority of the en banc court held that this language
meant only that a plaintiff suing under Title VII had to have Article III
standing to bring a lawsuit for a statutory violation. 17 3 It was, according
to the court, a separate matter whether Thompson could assert a cause of
action under the statute for retaliation.' 74 The anti-retaliation provision,
and not the enforcement provision, controlled who could sue for
retaliation and, pursuant to the plain language of the anti-retaliation
provision, such persons were limited to individuals who had actually
engaged in protected activity.
As explained below, the Supreme Court relied on Burlington's
material adversity standard to recognize the viability of third-party
retaliation claims under Title VII. Further, it held that a third party
could sue for the retaliation.
D. The Pro-Employee Court Strikes Again
The Supreme Court addressed two issues in Thompson: (1) did
NAS's firing of Thompson constitute unlawful retaliation; and (2) if so,
did Title VII grant Thompson a cause of action? 7 6 The Court answered
both questions in the affirmative. 7 7
171. Thompson, 567 F.3d at 817 (Rogers, J., concurring in the judgment) (explaining 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5 (West 2011)).
172. See id. at 809 n.1.
173. See id. (citing Leibovitz v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 252 F.3d 179, 185 (2d Cir. 2001))
(explaining that "[w]hat it means to be 'aggrieved' is a question of standing" and that,
although Thompson had standing to sue under Title VII because he met the minimum
requirements under Article Ill, it did not mean he had a right to sue for retaliation under the
statute).
174. See id. (explaining that the issue of standing and whether Thompson had "asserted a
cause of action" are distinct inquiries). The court explained that it had previously taken a
broad view of standing in Title VII actions, including extending standing as broadly as is
permitted by Article III of the U.S. Constitution. Thompson, 567 F.3d at 809 n.L
175. See id.
176. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 867 (2011).
177. See id. at 870.
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1. Protecting Third Parties Against an Employer's Retaliatory Ire
The Court had little difficulty finding that Burlington resolved the
first issue. Burlington held that Title VII's anti-retaliation provision
must be interpreted to cover a broad range of employer conduct.178 The
Court reached that conclusion after noting that, unlike the statute's
substantive provision, the anti-retaliation provision is not limited to
protecting against discrimination that relates to such factors as the terms
and conditions of employment.17 9 Considering the broad language and
purposes of the anti-retaliation provision, the Court adopted the material
adversity standard in Burlington to protect employees against the many
ways employers may retaliate against employees for engaging in
protected activity. Under that standard, the Court thought it was
"obvious that a reasonable worker might be dissuaded from engaging in
protected activity if she knew that her fianc6 would be fired."' 80
Contrary to how third-party retaliation claims had previously been
framed in the lower courts, i.e., whether a plaintiff in Thompson's
position had engaged in protected activity and was punished as a result
of his own activity,' 8 the issue in Thompson was whether an employee
in Regalado's position (as the plaintiffs fianc6e) had engaged in
protected activity and whether she could have found her fianc6's
subsequent firing to be materially adverse. 182 Indeed, NAS did not deny
that Thompson's termination would meet Burlington's material
adversity standard as to Regalado.'8 '
NAS argued, however, that recognizing third-party retaliation
claims would lead to difficult line-drawing issues regarding the types of
relationships entitled to protection. 184 NAS contended that firing one's
fianc6e might dissuade an employee from engaging in protected activity,
but what about "an employee's girlfriend, close friend, or trusted
coworker?"' 8 s NAS argued that applying Burlington in these
circumstances would expose the employer to liability any time it fired an
employee who happened to be associated with an employee who had
178. See id. at 868.
179. See id.
180. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 868.
181. See discussion supra Part III.A.
182. See Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 868.
183. See id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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filed charges with the EEOC.'
The Court "acknowledge[d] the force of this point," but did not
think that NAS's argument justified "a categorical rule that third-party
reprisals do not violate Title VII."'87 The Court explained that it adopted
a broad rule in Burlington because the anti-retaliation provision is
worded broadly. 88 It therefore saw no basis for excluding all third-party
reprisal claims.'8 9
The Court also declined to "identify a fixed class of relationships
for which third-party reprisals are unlawful."l 90 It explained that: "We
expect that firing a close family member will almost always meet the
Burlington standard, and inflicting a milder reprisal on a mere
acquaintance will almost never do so, but beyond that we are reluctant to
generalize."' 9' Given the broad language contained in the anti-
retaliation provision and the myriad contexts in which retaliation may
occur, the Court explained that the anti-retaliation provision was not
reducible to a set of rigid rules.192 The Court reiterated, however, that
under Burlington, harm must be judged from an objective perspective of
whether the adverse action, whatever it may be, would have deterred a
reasonable person from engaging in protected conduct.193
2. Third Party Retaliation Victims May Sue-The Zone ofInterest
Test
The Court found the issue of who may sue under the statute to be a
slightly more difficult question than whether Regalado could have found
Thompson's firing to be materially adverse.194 The Court disagreed with
the Sixth Circuit's view that Title VII's enforcement provision did not
control who had a right to sue for a violation of Title VII.' 95  The
enforcement provision "unquestionably permits a person claiming to be
186. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 868.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 868.
191. Id
192. Id.
193. See id. at 868-69 (quoting Burlington v. White, 548 U.S. 68-69 (2006)) ("We
emphasize . . . that 'the provision's standard for judging harm must be objective,' so as to
'avoi[d] the uncertainties and unfair discrepancies that can plague a judicial effort to
determine a plaintiffs unusual subjective feelings."').
194. See Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 869.
195. Id.
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aggrieved [by a violation of Title VII] to bring a 'civil action. "'96 Here,
an alleged unlawful employment practice had occurred and the statute
was violated when NAS allegedly fired Thompson for Regalado's
protected activity. According to the Court, the critical issue was
therefore whether Thompson was a person aggrieved because of that
unlawful employment practice or statutory violation.1 97 If he was, he
could sue.1 98
The Court was not writing on a blank slate in interpreting the term
"person aggrieved." In Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co.,1 99 the Court addressed a similar issue under Title VIII of the Civil
Rights Act (the Fair Housing Act), which proscribes discrimination in
the sale, rental and finance of dwellings.200 In Trafficante, two
plaintiffs--one white and one black-alleged harm after their landlord
had discriminated against other nonwhite, prospective tenants on the
basis of race. 20 ' The lower court dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint,
determining that the plaintiffs "were not within the class of persons" the
statute protected, which was limited to the "objects of discriminatory
housing practices."2 02 The Supreme Court reversed, noting that the FHA
allows a person aggrieved to commence a civil action in district court
after exhaustion of administrative remedies.203 In determining what
"person aggrieved" meant, the Court pointed to an earlier decision from
the Third Circuit, which had interpreted the phrase "person claiming to
be aggrieved" under Title VII as showing a congressional intent to
define standing to bring a civil action under the statute "as broadly as is
permitted by Article III of the Constitution."2 04  To satisfy that
constitutional minimal standard for standing, a plaintiff must show "an
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 869.
199. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
200. See 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2006).
201. Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 206-07 (alleging that landlord discriminated in a number of
ways, including manipulating the waiting list for apartments and using discriminatory
acceptance standards). The plaintiffs alleged that they were harmed by the landlord's
practices because, among other things, they lost the social benefits of living in a mixed-raced
community, missed business and professional opportunities that would have accrued from
living with minorities, and suffered from the stigma as residents of a "white ghetto." Id. at
208.
202. Id. at 208.
203. Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 209.
204. Id. at 209 (citing Hackett v. McGuire Bros., Inc., 445 F.2d 442 (3d Cir. 1971)).
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injury in fact caused by the defendant and remediable by the court." 2 0 5
The Court in Thompson decided not to read Trafficante as
permitting anyone who could satisfy Article III standing requirements to
be able to sue under Title VII.20 6 Ultimately, the Court believed that
extending standing under Title VII as far as Article III could lead to
absurd results. 207  For instance, it reasoned that a shareholder of a
company would be able to meet that minimal Article III standing
threshold and sue under Title VII if the company fired a productive
employee for racially discriminatory reasons and the shareholder could
show "his stock decreased as a consequence."208
Instead of the broadest possible interpretation, the Court defined the
term "person aggrieved" in a manner consistent with the meaning it had
given the term under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA").209 The
APA allows "suit to challenge a federal agency by any person . . .
adversely affected or aggrieved . . . within the meaning of a relevant
statute." 2 10 The Court had previously held that this language allows a
plaintiff to sue to challenge an agency action if he "falls within the 'zone
of interests' sought to be protected by the [statute] whose violation
forms the . . . basis for his complaint." 2 1' The Court explained that a
plaintiff will be considered not to meet that standard only where "the
plaintiffs interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the
purposes . .. [of] the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that
Congress intended to permit the suit."2 12 A plaintiff satisfies the test as
long as he or she asserts "an interest 'arguably sought to be protected by
the statutes."'
213
The Court held "that Thompson [fell] within the zone of interests
205. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 869 (2011).
206. Id. The Court further determined that the language in Trafficante, which declared
that the term "person aggrieved" referred to Article III standard requirements, was dicta. See
id The Court acknowledged that some of its other decisions reiterated that the "term
'aggrieved' in Title VII reaches as far as Article III permits . . . ." Id. The Court explained,
however, that Trafficante only stated that the "person aggrieved" was coextensive with Article
III standing insofar as plaintiffs were actual tenants. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 869.
207. Id
208. Id.
209. Id at 870.
210. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 870 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2011)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
211. Id. at 870.
212. Id. (quoting Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 399-400 (1987)).
213. Id. (quoting Nat'1 Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S.
479, 495 (1998)).
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protected by Title VII" and thus was a person aggrieved under the
214statute. First, Thompson was a NAS employee and "the purpose of
Title VII is to protect employees from their employer's unlawful
actions," which occurred in this case when NAS fired him as a means to
punish Regalado for her discrimination complaint.215 Second, the Court
explained that, unlike the shareholder, "Thompson [was] not an
accidental victim of the retaliation [or] . . . collateral damage . . . of the
employer's unlawful act."216 Rather, he was the means by which his
employer intended to harm Regalado. 2 17 "Hurting him was the unlawful
act by which [NAS] punished her."2 18 He was therefore "well within the
zone of interests sought to be protected by Title VII" and thus a person
aggrieved under the statute.219
The scope of the protection that Thompson will afford victims of
third party retaliation going forward will depend on how broadly the
lower courts read Thompson and, in turn, how broadly they choose to
interpret the anti-retaliation provision within the confines of the material
adversity standard Thompson adopts. These issues are discussed in the
following section.
IV. A NEW APPROACH TO AN OLD PROBLEM
A. Going Beyond Family, Paramour and Close Friend
The issue of who will be protected against third-party retaliation
and under what circumstances remains after Thompson. Under
214. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 870.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 870.
219. Id. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Breyer, filed a concurring opinion although
she also joined the opinion of the Court. See id. at 870-71. Justice Ginsburg noted that the
Court's holding comported with the long-standing position of the EEOC that retaliation can be
challenged "by both the individual who engaged in protected activity and [his or her] relative,
where both are employees" of the same defendant employer. Id. at 871 (citing U.S. EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 8-II(C)(3) (May
20, 1998), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/retal.htmi). Justice Ginsburg opined
that the "EEOC's statements" regarding third-party retaliation "merit[ed] deference . . . ."
Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 871. She further noted that the agency's position was "consistent
with the interpretations of analogous statues by other federal agencies." Id. (noting the
National Labor Relations Board's position that retaliation against a relative violates the
National Labor Relations Act).
288 [Vol. 30:249
FAMILY, CUBICLE MATE AND EVERYONE IN BETWEEN
Thompson's broad standard, no relationship or adverse action is beyond
the pale. For instance, the Court expected that a "mild[] reprisal on a
mere acquaintance" would almost never satisfy the material adversity
standard, but even under those circumstances, it did not foreclose the
possibility. 220 The Court's approach was guided both by the fact that the
anti-retaliation provision is broadly worded and that retaliation may
occur in various contexts.2 2 1 Thus, because the Court recognized that
retaliation may manifest itself in any number of ways, including but not
limited to an employer targeting an employee because his fiancee had
engaged in protected activity, the Court adopted a broad standard to
guide the lower courts in determining whom to protect.2 22
Despite the potential breadth of Thompson, lower courts may fall
back into the approach adopted by some courts prior to Thompson-
extending protection only to the closest associates and, in particular,
family members. Although Thompson is still a relatively recent
decision, there already is some indication that lower courts may be
placing such limits on Thompson.
For instance, in Morgan v. Napolitano, the plaintiff alleged third-
party retaliation for his wife's legal representation of individuals who
had filed discrimination claims against the plaintiffs employer.223
Regarding Thompson, the court explained that "[t]he Supreme Court
recently held that the anti-retaliation provisions of Title VII prohibit
retaliation against close family members of those who complain about
unlawful discrimination . . . . Similarly, in a case involving a
plaintiff alleging retaliation as a result of his father's protected activity,
the Fifth Circuit described Thompson's holding as allowing "an
employee [to] bring a Title VII claim on the basis of retaliation that he
suffered in response to protected activity engaged in by a co-worker who
[is] a close family member."225 To be sure these courts may only have
220. Id. at 868.
221. Id.
222. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 868.
223. No. CIV. S-09-2649 LKK/DAD, 2011 WL 2462968, at *11-12 (E.D. Cal. June 17,
2011).
224. Id. at *11 (emphasis added).
225. Zamora v. City of Houston, 425 Fed. App'x 314, 316 (5th Cir. 2011) (emphasis
added); see also Daughtry v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., No. 09-5111 (RBK/AMD), 2011 WL
601270, at *4 (D.N.J. Feb. 16, 2011) (explaining that Thompson "held ... [that] a plaintiff
may bring a third-party retaliation claim based on the protected activity of [a] close family
member"); id. at *5 ("Title VI's antiretaliation provision is capacious enough to encompass
an employer's attempt to retaliate against an employee by taking adverse action against that
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cast Thompson's holding as pertaining to close family members because
the facts before those courts involved such relationships. The courts'
characterization of Thompson's holding may not be indicative of how
these courts would handle an issue involving a non-familial relationship.
On the other hand, it is not unreasonable to conclude that plaintiffs in
relationships with the employee who engaged in protected activity that
are non-familial or that the Court deems to be insufficiently "close"
would face obstacles considering the limiting language these courts used
to describe Thompson's holding as well as the limitations imposed on
third-party retaliation claims pre-Thompson.226 These statements
regarding Thompson's holding may signal an early trend in limiting
protection against third-party retaliation to situations involving family or
the type of close, intimate relationship at issue in Thompson-i.e.,
family-like relationships.
Thompson of course did not limit protection against third-party
retaliation only to close family members. Certainly, Thompson extends
that far, but nothing in the opinion indicates that protection should stop
there. Casting Thompson's holding as only extending protection to close
family members (or to any particular relationship class) ignores the fact
that the Court declined to "identify a fixed class of relationships for
which third-party reprisals are unlawful."2 27 As explained, the Court
refused to adopt rigid rules regarding who might be protected, as the
anti-retaliation provision is worded broadly and retaliation may occur
"in a variety of workplace contexts. Thus, an overly restrictive
interpretation of Thompson ignores the breadth of the anti-retaliation
clause, which evinces Congress' intent to provide expansive protection
against retaliation and resulted in the Court's holding in Thompson in the
first place.
B. Protecting More Distant Associates
As Thompson recognized, there is no one-size fits all approach to
analyzing third-party retaliation claims. While the following discussion
is not intended to offer a "comprehensive set of clear rules," 22 9 it
employee's close family member.").
226. See discussion supra Part II.B. 1-2.
227. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 868.
228. Id.
229. Id.
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explores how Thompson might be interpreted to protect employees who
do not have a familial or close amity relationship with the person who
engaged in protected activity by examining a case that was decided prior
to Thompson and in which the court granted summary judgment in the
employer's favor. The relevant facts, which were set forth in the
Introduction, are briefly as follows:
George Cotton, a supervisory employee, engaged in protected
activity under Title VII and thereafter2 30 requested that his subordinate,
Janice Bates, be given a promotion and raise. 2 31 Their employer denied
his request. In her subsequent retaliation suit, Bates alleged that their
employer denied Cotton's request to get back at him for filing a
discrimination lawsuit. 232 The EEOC found by a preponderance of the
evidence that Bates and Cotton's employer denied Bates' promotion and
raise because of her association with Cotton.233
The district court rejected Bates' claim under the plain language of
the statute; this same type of analysis felled many third-party retaliation
claims before Thompson.234 This Article proposes that Bates should now
be resolved differently in order to be consistent with Thompson.
1. Material Adversity
Thompson instructs that both the relationship between employees
and the adverse action taken by the employer in response to protected
activity are relevant to the material adversity inquiry. Both points are
discussed below.
a. The Relationship Question Revisited
As Professor Estlund points out, coworkers spend much of their
waking time at work and interact and share work-related, as well as
personal, matters with one another while there, which often breeds
mutual affinity. 235 Therefore, one may infer that because Bates and
Cotton worked together in a supervisor-subordinate relationship, they
230. Bates v. Clark Cnty., No. 2:04-CV-00518-KJD-GWF, 2006 WL 3308214, at *1 (D.
Nev. Nov. 13, 2006).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Bates, 2006 WL 3308214, at *1.
234. See id. at *3.
235. Estlund, supra note 137, at 9.
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shared a mutual affinity. 236 Accordingly, Bates might argue that she and
Cotton were sufficiently close that a reasonable supervisor in Cotton's
position would be dissuaded from engaging in protected activity if he
knew that it would result in one of his subordinates not receiving the
raise and promotion that he had recommended.237
More importantly, the court should consider whether Bates' and
Cotton's employer ran afoul of the broadly worded text of the anti-
retaliation provision when it fired Cotton. As previously mentioned,
retaliation is an intentional act.238 Because the language of Title VII and
kindred statutes bar employers from retaliating against employees
because of their protected activity,239 the critical inquiry is whether the
employer sought to retaliate against Cotton for engaging in protected
activity by harming employees with whom Cotton associated.
The EEOC found probable cause that the employer denied Bates'
promotion and raise for retaliatory reasons. 2 40 For its part, the EEOC
has long interpreted the statutes it administers as recognizing that
actionable retaliation might arise where an employer acts adversely
against an employee "closely related to or associated with the person
exercising his or her statutory rights."24 1
While the facts are unclear, the employer may have been motivated
to target Bates because it believed that she and Cotton were close
enough that harming her would harm him 242 or that, because of their
236. Of course, the employer could seek to introduce evidence to the contrary.
237. Cf Craig v. Suburban Cablevision, Inc., 660 A.2d 505, 508-09 (N.J. 1995) (holding
that under state anti-discrimination statute, plaintiffs had standing to assert retaliation claim
after being fired for being "close friends" with their supervisor who had sued the company for
sex discrimination; plaintiffs showed that the entire "department was small and cohesive,"
which caused employer to retaliate against the entire department; further, employer perceived
that they supported their supervisor in her discrimination claim).
238. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 168 (2005).
239. See discussion supra Part III.A. 1; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
240. See Bates, 2006 WL 3308214, at *1. For purposes of this discussion, this Article
assumes that the employer denied Bates's promotion and raise because of Cotton's protected
activity.
241. See EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 219, at § 8-II(C)(3) (emphasis
added). It is not entirely clear what the EEOC means by "close" in this context, but the
example it sets forth in its compliance manual as illustrative involves retaliation against an
employee because of his son's protected activity. See id The manual, however, not only uses
"closely related to," but also "closely associated with," indicating that individuals beyond
close family members or relatives may be protected. Id.
242. Cf NLRB v. Advertisers Mfg. Co., 823 F.2d 1086, 1089 (7th Cir. 1987) (explaining
that employer's action against mother for son's protected activity would hurt him as well as
her if he loves her).
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association, Bates supported and assisted Cotton with his discrimination
suit.243
On the other hand, their employer may have been motivated to
target Bates for reasons other than believing the two were close, in terms
of an affective bond. Suppose, for instance, that because of Cotton's
protected activity, their employer denied Bates's promotion as part of a
scheme to usurp Cotton's authority to manage his department? Or
suppose that the position to which Bates was to be promoted would have
allowed her to take on some duties that Cotton had been performing, and
his employer denied Cotton's request to promote Bates to that position
only to ensure that Cotton's workload would remain more burdensome
and his life made more difficult because of his protected activity? In
either case, "a reasonable worker might be dissuaded from engaging in
244
protected activity" as a result of the employer's actions.
Several factors are relevant in assessing whether the attack on Bates
might be materially adverse to a reasonable person in Cotton's position.
First, as Professors Deborah Brake and Joanna Grossman explain, the
material adversity standard is not based on empirical evidence that sheds
light on the types of adversity that actually cause some people not to
complain about discrimination.245 Rather, it is based on judges'
"normative judgments about the level of adversity [that] employees
should tolerate" before employees may state an actionable retaliation
claim.246 Thus, nothing other than a stringent application of the material
adversity standard would prevent the alleged adverse action-tangible
harm-taken against Bates from being considered by Cotton to be
materially adverse-i.e., an action that at least might dissuade him from
engaging in protected activity.247 Second, Thompson supports the result
here. In Thompson, the Court failed to identify "a fixed class of
relationships for which third-party reprisals are unlawful" because it
243. Bates may in that instance be able to rely on the perception theory advanced in some
courts prior to Thompson. She would be protected on the basis of her own protected activity,
as her employer would have retaliated against her because it believed that Bates herself had
engaged in protected activity even if she had not actually done so. See discussion supra Parts
III.A.L.a, 2.a.
244. See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 868 (2011) (framing
relevant inquiry as whether a particular action "might" have deterred a reasonable person from
engaging in protected activity and instructing that the relevant circumstances must be taken
into account in reaching that determination).
245. Brake & Grossman, supra note 66, at 912.
246. Id.
247. See Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68.
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determined that there can be no one-size fits all approach to third-party
retaliation claims.248 It explained that, "[gliven the broad statutory text
and the variety of workplace contexts in which retaliation may occur,
Title VII's anti-retaliation provision is simply not reducible to a
comprehensive set of clear rules." 24 9  Moreover, while the court
explained that it expected a "mild[] reprisal" against a mere associate to
almost never meet the Burlington standard, it did not foreclose such a
claim.250 A per se rule drawing lines at protecting only family or close
friends would foreclose such claims. The adverse action here (denial of
Bates' promotion and raise) would not have occurred but for a
workplace association between Bates and Cotton-here the fact that she
worked for him.2 51 No closer association should be required where the
facts indicate that because of a workplace association, the employer
sought to retaliate against one employee (Cotton) by harming another
(Bates). The critical issue here, as with all retaliation claims, is
causation, i.e., whether the employer's adverse action against Bates was
motivated by Cotton's protected activity.2 52 If the facts support such a
causal connection, then the type of relationship between coworkers
should not alone determine whether a plaintiff has a cognizable claim for
third-party retaliation. To be sure, "[w]here the relationship between ...
employees is more attenuated, it [may be] more difficult to prove [an]
unlawful motivation."25 3  Such a showing, however, certainly may be
possible, and where it is, the plaintiffs claim should not be summarily
rejected on the basis of the relationship alone, as occurred pre-
Thompson.254
248. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 868.
249. Id. (emphasis added).
250. Id.
251. Bates v. Clark Cnty., No. 2:04-CV-00518-KJD-GWF, 2006 WL 3308214, at *1 (D.
Nev. Nov. 13, 2006).
252. See supra notes 134-136 and accompanying text.
253. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 567 F.3d 804, 829 (6th Cir. 2009) (White, J.,
dissenting), rev'd on other grounds and rem'd, 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011).
254. See e.g., Wychock v. Coordinated Health Sys., No. Civ. A. 01-3873, 2003 WL
927704, at *6 & n.5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 2003) (finding that, although plaintiff presented
sufficient evidence to demonstrate a dispute of material fact regarding whether the employer
terminated her for the reasons it proffered, her third-party retaliation claim failed because she
alleged no familial relationship with the coworker who engaged in protected activity; thus,
court had no reason to address other elements of her retaliation claim); see also Dehart v.
Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, 214 Fed. Appx., 437, 441, n.4 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that
the court did not need to determine whether causation existed between adverse action and
coworker's protected activity because plain language of the statute barred third-party
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Requiring an employee to plead and prove causation should quell
some of the concern by employers who fear that recognizing third-party
retaliation might put employers at risk whenever they sanction an
employee who has some connection to an employee who earlier engaged
in protected activity.255 Even if an employee could allege third-party
retaliation based on whatever connection he has to a coworker who
engaged in protected activity, the employee would not prevail on a claim
unless he or she could plead and prove the employer took the action
because of the other employee's protected activity.25 6
Moreover, the employer's concern in this regard may be overstated.
Third-party retaliation is not a new phenomenon, 2 57 and these claims
were recognized by many courts prior to Thompson.258 The reported
decisions, however, demonstrate that the overwhelming majority of
plaintiffs bringing these claims are relatives (particularly spouses),
romantic partners, or friends of the person who engaged in protected
activity. 259 Few decisions have involved plaintiffs who had only a
professional relationship with another coworker.260 Other than
speculation, there is no support for the argument that recognizing third-
party retaliation will result in a flux of third-party retaliation claims by
coworkers who have only a tangential connection to another coworker
who earlier engaged in protected activity.
retaliation claims altogether; even assuming that the court were to adopt the holding of one of
the courts that recognized such claims, those courts did not "extend standing as far as"
plaintiff urged since she failed to allege that a family relationship existed between herself and
the other coworker who engaged in protected activity).
255. See Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 868.
256. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
257. "To retaliate against a man by hurting a member of his family is an ancient method
of revenge, and is not unknown in the field of labor relations." NLRB v. Advertisers Mfg. Co.,
823 F.2d 1086, 1088 (7th Cir. 1987). The NLRB has recognized the concept under the NLRA
since the early 1960s. See Golub Bros. Concessions, 140 NLRB 120, 120-21 (1962)
(determining that employer violated the NLRA by firing wife in response to her husband's
union activities). Moreover, the first decisions addressing the issue under Title VII began to
surface in the 1970s. See, e.g., De Medina v. Reinhardt, 444 F. Supp. 573, 580 (D.D.C. 1978)
(recognizing third-party reprisal claim under Title VII; although "Congress did not expressly
consider the possibility of third-party reprisals . . . the very clear intent of Congress would be
undermined by" a construction of the statute that fails to recognize such claims; pointing to
one other decision from federal district court that also raised an issue of third-party retaliation
a few years prior), aff'd in part and remanded in part, 686 F.2d 997 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see also
discussion Part III.B.1-2 (discussing decisions in which plaintiffs have alleged third-party
retaliation claims prior to Thompson).
258. See discussion Part III.B. 1-2.
259. See id.
260. See id.
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Indeed, while Thompson is still a new decision, the class of
employees who have alleged third-party retaliation claims post-
Thompson have all alleged involvement in an intimate relationship with
a coworker who engaged in protected activity. 26' Thus, employees with
no close relationship have not rushed the courts with third-party
retaliation claims as a result of Thompson. Nevertheless, where an
employee does bring a claim and demonstrates causation, the individual
should be protected for the reasons explained.
Finally, reading the material adversity standard as satisfied under
the circumstances presented here is consistent with the purposes of the
anti-retaliation provision. For instance, in this case perhaps Bates and
Cotton are not friends, but other employees watching what is going on
may consider themselves to be friends. Allowing the retaliation to occur
here might affect the willingness of others to engage in protected activity
if they know that the employer has carte blanche to take it out on most
other employees with whom they associate-from the cubicle mate to
the workplace buddy. Family may be off limits, but Thompson rejected
261. See, e.g., Zamora v. City of Houston, 425 Fed.App'x 314, 317 (5th Cir. 2011)
(remanding case in light of Thompson where son alleged he was retaliated against for his
father's protected activity); Webber v. Christus Schumpert Health Sys., No. 10-1177, 2011
WL 3880398, at *9 (W.D. La. Sept. 2, 2011) (alleging that plaintiff and employee who
engaged in protected activity had a "close relationship" as they were friends who vacationed
together); Male v. Tops Markets, LLC, No. 09-CV-6532 CJS, 2011 WL 2471449, at *5
(W.D.N.Y. June 22, 2011) (alleging that husband was terminated because his wife had
engaged in protected activity); Morgan v. Napolitano, No. CIV. S-09-2649 LKK/DAD, 2011
WL 246298, at *I1- 12 (E.D. Cal. June 17, 2011) (finding that husband stated claim by
alleging retaliation as a result of wife's legal representation of other employee's in
discrimination cases against husband's employer); McGhee v. Healthcare Servs. Grp, Inc.,
No. 5:10cv279/RS-EMT, 2011 WL 818662, at *3 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 2, 2011) (holding that
husband stated claim for retaliation for wife's protected activity); DeGroat v. Pa. Dep't of
Transp., No. 3:08cv463, 2011 WL 672416, at *1, 4 (M.D.Pa. Feb. 17, 2011) (relying on pre-
Thompson circuit precedent to reject third-party retaliation decision where plaintiff alleged
retaliation as a result of his fianc6e's protected activity; noting that couple had been together
for fifteen years in addition to being engaged); Daughtry v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., No. 09-
5111 (RBK/AMD), 2011 WL 601270, at *3 (D.N.J. Feb. 16, 2011) (alleging retaliation as a
result of wife's engagement in protected activity under Title VII); Rodriguez-Monguio v.
Ohio State Univ., No. 2:08-cv-00139, 2011 WL 335854, at *14 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 31, 2011)
(allowing plaintiff to state a claim for third-party retaliation by relying on the protected
activity of her "significant other," but ultimately rejecting the claim as she failed to show
causal connection between the protected activity and the alleged adverse actions); Condiff v.
Hart Cnty. Sch. Dist., 770 F.Supp.2d 876, 883 (W.D. Ky. 2011) (suggesting in dicta that
Thompson applies to claims raised under Title IX and contending that under that theory,
plaintiff would be protected against retaliation on the basis of her husband's protected
activity).
296 [Vol. 30:249
FAMILY, CUBICLE MATE AND EVERYONE IN BETWEEN
a bright-line rule of protecting only family.26 2 An employee would be
left to size up all workplace relationships to determine whether a
discrimination complaint might doom a coworker with whom she has a
connection to adverse treatment. The employee would be left to wonder
how close is close enough? An employee contemplating whether to
engage in protected activity should not have to guess at how close he or
she needs to be to a coworker before Title VII affords protection to that
coworker against third-party retaliation. Thus, allowing this type of
retaliation to go unchecked undermines Title VII's goal of maintaining
unfettered access to the statutory scheme, as it does not foster an
environment in which "no person would be deterred" from filing
complaints and serving as witnesses in Title VII actions.263
b. The Retaliatory Act
Thompson also raises the issue of the type of action visited upon the
third-party because of a coworker's protected activity. Thompson
instructs that material adversity is not only judged on the basis of a
particular relationship between the employee who engaged in protected
activity and the employee who was targeted, but also how that employee
was targeted.264 In Thompson, the Court explained that it "expect[ed]
that firing a close family member will almost always meet" the material
adversity standard, and that "inflicting a milder reprisal on a mere
acquaintance will almost never do so. 2 65  Beyond that, the court was
reluctant to generalize and for good reason.266
The material adversity standard should be a flexible one, as there
may be circumstances unique to a particular case that should be taken
into account.267 Burlington, for instance, explained that a schedule
262. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 868 (2011).
263. DeMedina v. Reinhardt, 444 F.Supp. 573, 580 (D.D.C. 1978) (holding that third-
party reprisals should be unlawful under Title VII, as doing otherwise would undermine
Congress' "unmistakabl[e] inten[t] to ensure that no person would be deterred from exercising
his rights under Title VII by threat of discriminatory retaliation") (emphasis added); see also
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (explaining that a broad
interpretation of Title VII's anti-retaliation provision is necessary because Title VII depends
for its enforcement on individuals who are willing to file complaints and act as witnesses).
264. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 868.
265. Id. (emphasis added).
266. See id. at 868.
267. See Burlington, 548 U.S. at 69 (noting that the material adversity standard is stated
"in general terms because the significance of any given act of retaliation will often depend
upon the particular circumstances").
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change may matter little to an employee, but may mean a great deal to a
mother with school-age children. 268 Likewise, a wife's schedule change
may or may not matter much to her husband, who works evenings for
the same employer. The analysis may change greatly, however, if the
employer also moves the wife to evenings knowing the couple has
young children and the wife's former schedule allowed her to care for
them during the evenings.
At a minimum, without any unique circumstances that may attend
to a particular case, an employer should not be allowed to do indirectly
what it cannot do directly. Although the Court in Burlington declined to
read a tangibility requirement into the anti-retaliation provision, such
harm in most instances would likely have been actionable under the
most stringent of standards prior to Burlington.2 69  If in response to
Cotton's protected activity, an employer denied him a promotion and
pay increase, that tangible employment action act would typically satisfy
the material adversity standard.2 7 0
Where a court would find a particular act to be materially adverse if
taken against the employee who engaged in protected activity, it should
impose no more onerous a burden on the employee who was indirectly
targeted as a result of that same protected activity. The denial of a
promotion and raise would be materially adverse had it happened to
Cotton because of his protected activity and should also be considered
materially adverse as to Cotton, even though it was inflicted indirectly
on a coworker because of Cotton's protected activity.
2. Person Aggrieved
The only remaining issue is whether Bates is a "person aggrieved"
under the zone of interests test. This Article proposes that Bates is a
person aggrieved. As the Court explained in Thompson, a plaintiff fails
to meet the test only where his or her interest is "marginally related to or
inconsistent with [Title VII's] purposes . . . [so] that it cannot reasonably
be assumed that Congress intended to permit suit." 2 7 1  The Court
268. Id.
269. See id. at 60, 67 (rejecting the most onerous standard that lower courts had used to
determine the threshold for actionable harm under the anti-retaliation provision; "ultimate
employment decisions" test was the most onerous standard used and included such acts as
promotion and compensation decisions).
270. See id.
271. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 870.
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adopted the standard out of a concern that a failure to limit who may sue
for a Title VII violation might allow individuals who are not harmed by
discrimination in connection with their employment to sue any employer
272under an employment discrimination statute. Allowing Bates to sue in
the aforementioned scenario does not implicate these concerns.
Title VII is intended to protect employees from discrimination,2 73
which occurred here when the employer denied Cotton's request to
promote Bates for retaliatory reasons.274 Further, denying Cotton's
request to promote Bates was the means by which the employer intended
to retaliate against Cotton. As the Court put it, "injuring [Bates] was the
employer's intended means of harming [Cotton]." 275
CONCLUSION
It may well be accurate to call the current Court pro-employee
when it comes to its recent decisions interpreting Title VII's anti-
retaliation provision. In adjudicating anti-retaliation claims, the lower
courts should follow suit by relying on Title VII's broad text and the
purposes that underlie it. Thompson continues the Court's trend with
regard to retaliation. It gives courts broad discretion to determine the
types of action that a reasonable employee would find materially
adverse. Courts interpreting Title VII and similar statutes should use
that discretion in a manner that broadly protects against retaliation
consistent with the broadly-worded anti-retaliation provisions Congress
enacted and the Court's approach to interpreting these provisions. In
short, the material adversity standard Thompson adopts should be
interpreted to root out third-party retaliation in the many contexts in
which it may manifest-family, friend, cubicle mate or otherwise.
272. See id. at 869. The example the court used to express this concern is a situation
where a company's shareholder would state a Title VII claim against the company because a
productive employee of the company was fired for discriminatory reasons. Id. The
shareholder would claim she was aggrieved because the firing made the company less
profitable. Id
273. See Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 870.
274. Cf id. at 870 (stating that statute was violated when employer fired Thompson to get
back at his fianc6e).
275. Id.
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